.El yo en la teoría de Freud y en la técnica psicoanalítica (1955-1956)

Artículos psicoanalíticos citados por Lacan en su seminario.

Nota bene: *esta recopilación es una transcripción de los artículos originales, su objetivo es ser un apoyo en la lectura de los seminarios de Jacques Lacan. Se ha tratado de realizarla con la máxima fidelidad posible, sin embargo, dado que es una transcripción puede incluir errores involuntarios, por lo cual urgimos a los lectores que quieran citar estos textos a consultar directamente la fuente original, ya sea en las revistas en papel o a través del CD-ROM generado para ese propósito por la Asociación Psicoanalítica Americana, y que puede ser consultado y/o adquirido a través de su sitio de internet.*

Dado que este sitio es gratuito, no pretende lucrar de ninguna manera con estas transcripciones y su finalidad es únicamente contribuir al estudio crítico y documentado del psicoanálisis, en particular de la enseñanza de Jacques Lacan

1950) THREE PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR THE TERMINATION OF TREATMENT. INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL., 31:194 (IJP)

THREE PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR THE TERMINATION OF TREATMENT[1]

W. HOFFER

To formulate criteria for the termination of treatment is far from an easy task. Simplification has to be avoided, in spite of the demands of beginners. What has been said about termination in the past may be disappointing, but cannot be disregarded. One cannot learn from the mistakes of others if one overlooks them. It needs a collective effort, for which this generation of psycho-analysts probably is not yet prepared, and the awareness that we are not out for dicta but in search of the principles which determine our actions.

About ten years ago the members of this Society were asked: 'What are your criteria for termination? symptomatic, psycho-sexual, social? are your criteria mostly intuitive?' One-third, that is eight out of twenty-four psycho-analysts failed to answer the question at all, and a majority admitted that their criteria were essentially intuitive (Glover and Brierley, 1940, p. 111).

What do I think are the criteria for the termination of treatment? My answer would be this:

In comparison with other psychotherapeutic methods, psycho-analysis is not characterized by a certain number of sessions per week, or by the duration over a number of years, or by the arrangements in the consulting room, but by the fact that it initiates, lends aid to and utilizes certain mental processes, which were for the first time studied and described by Freud.

These mental processes take effect during the whole of the analytic procedure and play their part when termination is in the analyst's mind.

Firstly: Psycho-analysis aims at bringing consciousness and the unconscious nearer together. This is achieved by means of free associations and interpretations. Here we have one of the oldest and most valid criteria for termination of treatment: the degree of awareness of unconscious mental processes.

Secondly: Were it not that the structure of the mind is more complicated than the division between consciousness and the unconscious implies the patient would first acquire the art of interpretation, then apply it to the derivatives of his unconscious conflicts and strivings, and finally control tensions by translating them into the language of consciousness. In fact, this procedure is still the sole aim of certain methods of psychotherapy derived from early psycho-analytic teaching (abreaction through speech).

In psycho-analysis more than this happens: resistances have to be spotted and interpreted. Less repression, and less resistance against the repressed, results in an increase of preconscious and perceptual mental activity. The counter-cathexis which, before removal of repression and resistance, has guarded the unconscious resistances is now partly invested in the transference situation, partly used in the mental activities outside the transference situation from which the patient had so far been debarred. Counter-transference plays its rôle in the manner in which these energies are channelled during the analytic process.

Thirdly: Apart from making the unconscious conscious and removing resistances, the change from acting out into *remembering in the transference situation* is the third important aspect of the analytic process, in which both patient and therapist are involved. The aim is to limit the scope of the transference neurosis by widening the knowledge of the patient's past and reducing the necessity to repeat in the present.

Within the transference neurosis the length of treatment and its termination have to be viewed from two angles: the scope of the transference neurosis in width and depth and the analyst's skill in dealing with it.

Why not turn to other aspects when searching for criteria for termination?

We are as yet far from being in a position to describe all the mental processes which take place in the analytic situation, and we cannot say how they become involved in the analytic process. As you know, for instance, telepathic

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[1]Contribution to a Symposium on 'Criteria for the termination of psycho-analytic treatment' held by the British Psycho-Analytical Society on March 2, 1949.

transference processes have been suggested or described by Freud, Burlingham, Eisenbund, Gillespie and others. What we have tacitly agreed upon is to call a procedure analytic which takes into account the difference between conscious and unconscious, the existence of resistances and the transference phenomena. On these, I think, we have to focus our interest when discussing termination of treatment.

The symptoms are the signposts for the understanding of the patient's mental machinery; his psychosexual and social relations, his failures and achievements, the pleasure he enjoys and the anxiety and guilt he suffers are merely results or accompaniments of the functioning of his mental apparatus. In the analytic situation we are actively dealing with processes in this apparatus and with functions of inner perception leading to awareness.

The criteria for the analytic process itself and for its termination should therefore be *psychological*. The process itself, we know, is conditioned by various factors which we cannot change as we will.

Sometimes it has been made a reproach against analysis that the patient knew everything but no change took place in his behaviour or mental activities. I think this is one of the many points where individual factors enter the picture of psycho-analytic practice, e.g. the analyst's range of knowledge of mental mechanisms.

What is the fate of the transference neurosis in relation to termination of treatment?

Once it was thought that the transference neurosis becomes dissolved during treatment (by interpretation and working through) and this leads to termination. The flame, it was thought, dies owing to lack of fuel. We now assume that this can hardly ever happen. The transference neurosis is not a reactive, but an active manifestation; it is not created by reality but by the spontaneous pressure of the Id.

The infantile object relationships become intensified in the transference neurosis and remain there at first unrecognized. If the subsequent emergence of a transference neurosis is not

interfered with by too brisk transference interpretations, symptomatic-neurotic suffering changes into feelings of inferiority and of mental pain due to frustrated infantile love (transference neurosis proper). Interpretations lead to the transformation of these transference feelings and actions into memories. Mental energy, invested in the repressed and disguised infantile object relations, is thus at first drained into the transference situation and then into memories of those relations, a process which has been much clarified by James Strachey. The painful actuality in the transference situation becomes transformed into memories of the past, and with it the patient's actual infantile relation towards his analyst will gradually become past as well and will relieve him from much actual suffering.

This, however, can happen only if the patient identifies himself with the analyst in his analytic activity. It shows itself in the patient's ability to interpret for himself the derivatives of his unconscious, to spot and to remove resistances, and finally to understand and within limits to control the acting out within the social setting.

This is an Ego activity which has been acquired during the course of analytic treatment, which has been learned by the patient without being taught. It may go on after termination of the actual analysis, or after this has been restricted in frequency, time and aim.

This learning process is closely related to what has been called the substitution of the patient's infantile super-ego by the analyst's super-ego. I think it not advantageous to call it a substitution. It is a change in the patient's ego due to identification ; it affects of course the ego-ideal and therefore the super-ego, but the mechanism involved is *identification* within the ego with the *functions* of the analyst. Emerging out of the transference neurosis it is another *psychological criterion* for termination of treatment.

The scope of this identification is restricted by the small number of functions an analyst has to fulfil in an analysis. To say it as simply as possible: it is the identification with the analyst's skill in interpretation, in analysing resistances and transforming acting out into memories of infantile conflict and trauma through the medium of transference acutely experienced and interpreted.

Individual analysis is the study of individual histories. History can never be exhausted, but its study does not always need two people. Treatment can be terminated when the analytic process can hopefully be entrusted to the apprentice himself. Provision for help if necessary has of course to be made.

There are patients who do not fit into this picture, and for them psychological criteria either do not exist or have to be looked for elsewhere.

1951) TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY. PSYCHOANAL. Q., 20:31 (PAQ)

TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EGO PSYCHOLOGY

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In one of his last papers, Freud (4) wrote that in his opinion the ways in which psychoanalytic technique achieves its aims are sufficiently elucidated; therefore, one ought rather ask what obstacles this therapy encounters. However, in the analytic literature many issues, not only about the practice but also about the theory of technique, remain controversial. We shall discuss what these variations mean, and to which differences in the theoretical or practical approach we can trace them.

Progress in the development of analysis is no doubt mostly based on clinical discoveries; however, now that analysis has come of age, we realize more clearly also the promoting and interdependent roles of both technique and theory. Retrospectively, we may say that on different levels of its development, analytic technique was used in different ways, not only for the immediate therapeutic aims, but also in determining the possible scope of observation—of fact finding in general. Theoretical concepts helped at various stages and in various ways to facilitate the organization of the data observed (actually also to seeing the facts), and to advance the exactness and effectiveness of technique. In the course of its growth, an integration—at times more, at times less complete—developed among the clinical, technical, and theoretical elements into a state of reciprocal influence. Faulty theoretical concepts and incomplete insight frequently lead to faulty technique, and there are many examples of adherence to technical mistakes which leads to distortions and misinterpretation of facts.

As to the relation of technique and theory, whenever a lack of integration occurs, both aspects are likely to suffer. A gradual separation of theory and technique, commended by many,

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Read at the panel of the same title at the midwinter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, December 1948.

would prove inefficient today, as it proved inexpedient in the past. The often used comparison with certain medical specialties is misleading.

A defect in integration of both sides may also be due to one of these aspects outdistancing the other in the course of analytic development. Elsewhere I have tried to demonstrate that the lag is, for the time being, rather on the side of technique than on the side of theory and of psychological insight. The reverse obtained when Freud introduced the systematic analysis of resistances, without at first realizing all its implications for ego psychology. Today we actually know much more than we are able to use technically in a rational way. Genuinely technical discoveries—as was abreaction, and as was analysis of resistances—we do not find in the latest phase of analysis; but the body of systematic psychological and psychopathological knowledge has been considerably increased. However, an equilibrium is likely to be re-established, as has happened and proved fruitful before. For some time, at least one trend in the analyst's interest in technical problems has been following the lead and gradually assimilating the advances in psychoanalytic psychology and psychopathology: ego psychology.

While proceeding along these lines from psychology to technique, we are of course aware of the fact that psychoanalytic technique is more than a mere application of psychological theory. Freud was admittedly and intentionally rather restrained in formulating technical rules; and we are still far from dispensing a collection of technical prescriptions that would cover every given situation. To characterize the present, we may say that we know some general technical principles that help us to avoid some typical mistakes, and in the summarized experience of skilled analysts we have at our disposal a huge potential reservoir of specific technical

knowledge, which, in the course of training analysis and supervision, is transmitted to students of analysis. Comparatively few systematic and collective efforts have so far been made to make this potential reservoir available on a larger scale, though, in principle, I do not see any reason why it could not be done. In

the meantime, we are trying to develop some rules somewhere in between the generality of acknowledged technical principles and the specificity of clinical experiences, some *principia media*, to choose a term used by J. S. Mill. That is to say, we study variations of our technical principles according to each patient's psychological structure, clinical symptomatology, age level, and so on. Still, considering the interaction of what we may call the aspect of rational planning in our work with its unconscious elements, we cannot but fully subscribe to what Ferenczi emphasized more than twenty years ago: the essential importance of keeping psychoanalytic technique flexible, especially when we are trying to establish what technique may gain from additional scientific insight; also in teaching one must avoid giving the student the impression that actually a complete set of rules exists which just his lack of experience prevents him from knowing. Neither shall we forget that besides the guidance by insight of our technique, every analyst's work with every single one of his patients has also a truly experimental character. There is a continuous sequence of trials and errors, as we check our technical procedures by their immediate consequences and by their therapeutic results.

The technical implications of ego psychology point first and foremost to what a closer insight into defense has taught us about the understanding and handling of resistances; but the ego being what it is, it also means progress in ways of understanding and dealing with the reality aspect of our patients' behavior. Tracing neurotic to real anxiety (1) was one decisive step and obviously an outgrowth of the fact that Freud was turning his interest to the clinical implications of ego psychology. Clearly an outcome of this is the way Anna Freud (2) approaches and deals with conflict with reality, which she constitutes as a field of concern to analysis equal to the conflicts of the ego with the id and with the superego. Thus the way was opened to a better understanding of adaptation and its role in the neurotic as well as in the so-called normal individual. Here, too, there are many practical implications, and

we do not feel that we can handle a patient's neurosis without dealing with its interaction with normal functioning. We feel that in order fully to grasp neurosis and its etiology, we have to understand the etiology of health, too. It is true that some degree of realization of all this has always been present in analysis, but the shift of accent is considerable enough to be noteworthy. That in analysis we are dealing with a patient's total personality has become actually true only since this shift in thinking, and in the corresponding technique, was realized. Likewise, the consideration of those interdependencies which we find between conflict and the nonconflictual sphere of the ego points in the same direction. As no concept of ego strength, no concept of mental health, is satisfactory which does not consider nonconflictual functioning as well as the central conflicts (3), this also has a bearing on our technique in so far as it helps to define more precisely the aims of psychoanalytic therapy.

Thinking along the same lines, and if we let our curiosity tempt us to look into the future, we may say that technical progress might depend on a more systematic study of the various functional units within the ego. To the study of the ego's relations with the id or the superego, that is of the intersystemic conflicts and correlations, we shall have to add a more detailed study of the intrasystemic correlations. I spoke of one such unit within the ego: the nonconflictual sphere. But we have to view it constantly in relation to the units of functioning that represent the countercathexes, or the dealings with reality, or the preconscious automatized patterns, or that special functional control and integration that we know under the name of synthetic, or better, organizing function. It would be in line with much research work done today if this intrasystemic approach were to become the subject of more specific investigation. What do we mean when say that we help the patient's ego; or, strengthen his ego? This certainly cannot be

adequately described by referring only to the redistributions of energy between the id and the ego, or between the superego and the ego; shifts from certain spheres of the ego to other

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[1]In a later paper (4) I tried to define more precisely primary and secondary autonomy.

functional units within the ego are involved. No definition of ego strength would I consider complete which does not refer to the intrasystemic structures, that is, which does not take into account the relative preponderance of certain ego functions over others; for instance, whether or not the autonomous ego functions[1] are interfered with by the defensive functions, and also the extent to which the energies the various ego functions use are neutralized. No doubt what Freud says about resistances in a certain sense being segregated within the ego (5), or about splitting of the ego in the process of defense, or what Richard Sterba says about the splitting of the ego in analysis (6), are examples of intrasystemic thinking, and I could give quite a few others. What I want to state here is that those insights have so far been gained as by-products rather than as results of a consistent scrutiny of intrasystemic synergistic and antagonistic relations, and that in many instances in which we speak of 'the ego', a differential consideration of various ego functions is indicated.

All this is to show that analysis is gradually and unavoidably, though hesitantly, becoming a general psychology, including normal as well as pathological, nonconflictual as well as conflictual behavior (the two oppositions do not coincide); and that technique is likely to profit further from this development as it has constantly done since this trend was started by Freud.

I have not explicitly mentioned so far that aspect of ego psychology which we usually designate as the structural point of view. Freud's older conception of the psychic apparatus described it in three strata: the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. The most incisive change which took place in Freud's model of psychic personality can be pictured as adding to its description as a series of layers its representation as a (more or less) integrated whole, subdivisible in centers of mental functioning—these substructures being defined by their functions, and their demarcation being based on the fact that empirically he found greater coherence among some functions

than among others (7). This facilitates a multidimensional approach and, so far as psychoanalytic psychology and therapy goes, it has been rather generally accepted as being more useful in giving account of the dynamic and economic properties of mental life. In technique the concept of stratification proved very useful and still is, in so far as making unconscious processes conscious by way of the preconscious is probably the one main and constant factor responsible for our therapeutic results. However, based on the concept of layers and on resistance analysis—maybe because technique at times too violently encroached upon theory—the concept of historical stratification was developed by Wilhelm Reich (8), and with it a picture of personality that is definitely prestructural, in terms of the development of psychoanalytic psychology. Nunberg (9) had early warned against this simplification. Fenichel, too, in his book on technique (10), realized some of its shortcomings and held that certain character disturbances show spontaneous chaotic situations in analysis; and that displacements of the psychic layers may be brought about by the patient's current life, as well as by instinctual temptations or re-enforcement of anxiety. We may add that the factors counteracting the establishment of a clear-cut picture of historical stratification seem to be much more numerous. Displacements of historical layers are quite generally an essential part of mental life, as we see it in analysis. Without wishing to discuss that particular theory, it is mentioned in this connection because this approach—not the truest to fact, but obviously containing some truth—had the advantage of linking in the simplest and most radical way the 'correct sequence of interpretations' with the patient's life history; and also because, after having outlived its usefulness in this radical form, it may have become more or less of a handicap. It

may still be responsible for a certain rigidity in our approach, while we try to utilize more fully in our technique the implications of a structural versus a one-sided 'layer' concept.

There is no doubt, however, that a great variety of approaches is gradually converging in this direction. This most

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clearly appears if one traces the subsequent vicissitudes and implications of the application of Freud's formula, 'bringing unconscious material into consciousness', in the development of psychoanalysis. The formula remained, while its meaning was broadened and deepened by Freud's growing insight into the structure of the neurotic conflict. Its topical significance had already been understood at the time of the Studies in Hysteria. But soon Freud found that just to give the patient a translation of the derivatives of his unconscious was not enough. The next step was characterized by a more exact insight into the dynamic and economic problems of resistance, and by laying down accordingly rules for the 'what', 'when', and 'how much' of interpretation; it was defined in its main aspects in Freud's papers on technique, published in 1913, 1914, and 1915. He advised the analyst not to select particular elements or problems to work on, but to start with whatever presents itself on the psychic surface, and to use interpretation mainly for the purpose of recognizing the resistance and making it conscious to the patient. Certainly not every analyst works exactly this way even today. Still, these are the fundaments of what we may call the standard analytic technique. Thus, 'making the unconscious conscious' is invested with additional significance. The corresponding basic psychological progress is defined in Freud's papers on metapsychology.

Some years later, in the twenties, these principles became the subject of a thorough study, of active discussion, elaboration, and partial modification by other analysts. Soon this discussion came under the impact of the delineation of units of function (ego, id, superego), that is, of the structural aspect. Here, once more a fruitful interdependence of theory and practice became apparent. The unconscious nature of resistance, a fact found through clinical observation under the conditions of the analytic therapy, became a cornerstone in the development of Freud's later formulations of the unconscious aspects of the ego. No less important was the reverse influence of theory on clinical practice with patients. First of all, ego psychology meant, and means, a broadening of our field of

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view. 'Good' theory helps us to discover the facts (for instance to recognize a resistance as such), and it helps us to see the connections among facts. This part of our psychology also gives a deeper understanding of the forms and mechanisms of defense, and a more exact consideration of the details of the patient's inner experience and behavior; corresponding to this, on the side of technique, is a tendency toward more concrete, more specific interpretation. This approach includes in its scope the infinite variety of individual characteristics, and a degree of differentiation which had not been accessible to the previous, somewhat shadowy knowledge of ego functions. It also sharpened our eyes to the frequent identity of patterns in often widely divergent fields of an individual's behavior as described by Anna Freud.

One problem connected with this development I would like to discuss briefly here: speech and language. Freud found that in the transition from the unconscious to the preconscious state, a cathexis of verbal presentations is added to the thing-cathexis. Later, Nunberg (11), already thinking along structural lines, described the role of the synthetic function of the ego in this process toward binding and assimilation. One may add that the function of the verbal element in the analytic situation is not limited to verbal cathexis and integration, but also comprises expression. I am referring to the specific role of speech in the analytic situation. This, too, contributes toward fixing the previously unconscious element in the preconscious or conscious mind of the patient. Another structural function of the same process is due to the fact that the fixing of verbal symbols is in the development of the child linked with concept formation and represents one main road toward objectivation; it plays a similar role in the analytic situation. It facilitates the patient's way to a better grasp of physical as well as psychic reality. Besides, the

action of speaking has also a specific social meaning inasmuch as it serves communication, and in this respect becomes the object of the analysis of transference. There is also, of course, in speech the aspect of emotional discharge or abreaction. Finally, the influence of

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the superego on speech and language is familiar to us, especially from psychopathology. This is to say that the different aspects of speech and language, as described by psychologists and philosophers, become coherent and meaningful if viewed from the angle of our structural model, and that in this case actually all the structural implications have today become relevant for our handling of the analytic situation. In trying to clarify the technical aspects of the problems involved, we are actually following the lead of structural psychology.

The necessity for scrutinizing our patients' material as to its derivations from all the psychic systems, without bias in favor of one or the other, is nowadays rather generally accepted as a technical principle. Also we meet many situations in which even the familiar opposition of defense and instinct is losing much of its absolute character. Some of these situations are rather well known, as is the case in which defense is sexualized or—equally often—'aggressivized' (if we may use the expression); or instances in which an instinctual tendency is used for defensive purposes. Most of these cases can be handled according to general rules derived from what we know about the dynamics and economics of interpretation as, for instance: resistance interpretation precedes interpretation of content, etc. In other cases these rules do not prove subtle enough; unexpected and sometimes highly troublesome quantitative or qualitative side effects of interpretations may occur. This, then, is a problem that clearly transcends those technical situations I gave here as illustrations. If such incidental effects occur, our dosage or timing may have been wrong. But it may also be—and this is the more instructive case—that we have missed some structural implications though correctly following quantitative economic principles. It may be that we have considered this quantitative aspect of a resistance only and have not considered precisely enough how the same quantity may involve the various functions of the ego and the superego in a different degree. While concentrating on the analysis of a resistance, we are actually working on many parts of the field at the same time. But we are not always mindful of the possible side effects if we

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focus too exclusively on the duality 'defense—warded-off impulse' only. General rules about the dynamics and economics of interpretation are incomplete as long as we do not consider that, besides the quantitative factors, the resistances represent also the ways in which the various psychic functions, directly or often indirectly, participate in defense—'participation' pointing to intersystemic and intrasystemic correlations, including also their genetic aspects, which here refers to the memory systems. Of course, we do know something about how to handle different forms of resistance differently even when they appear to be equivalent when looked at from the economic angle. I made my point only because I feel that this structural aspect of interpretation is still less completely understood and less explicitly stated than its dynamic and economic aspects. One day we shall probably be able to formulate more systematically the rational element of our technique, that is 'planning' the predictable outcome of our interventions, with respect to these structural implications.

This will in part depend on progress in a familiar field of analytic research: a deeper understanding of the choice and of the quantitative aspect of defense mechanisms, of their chronology, typical and individual, but above all else, of their genetic and economic interrelatedness with other functions of the ego. To touch at least on one of the genetic problems involved, we can assume that many defense mechanisms are traceable to primitive defensive actions against the outside world, which in part probably belong to the ego's primary autonomy, and that only later, in situations of psychic conflicts, do they develop into what we specifically call mechanisms of defense. Also, we can say of many of them that after having been established as such, they become in a secondary way invested with other functions (intellectualization, for example). This makes for a complicated overlapping of their role as

resistances with various other functions they represent. It is because of this, that if we want to analyze defenses in a rational way, we have to consider their structural, their intersystemic or intrasystemic ramifications, beyond the aspect of resistance they offer to analysis. This

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[2]In describing similar phenomena, Gordon Allport (13) has used the term 'functional autonomy', approaching the problem from an angle that is closer to psychoanalytic thinking than he seems to assume.

is, of course, known in principle, but in a way our knowledge in this respect is not always specific enough. Genetically, some of the pertinent questions of structural psychology can be viewed from the angle of what, borrowing a term from biology, we may call 'change of function' (12) and of what I call 'secondary autonomy'.[2] It means relative functional independence, despite genetic continuity, and invites marking off more clearly the functional aspect from the genetic one. This relative independence may be more or less complete. In some cases it is practically irreversible under the conditions of 'normal', everyday behavior. But we know from experience that even in many of these instances reversibility can be observed under special conditions, as in dreams, in neuroses and psychoses, and in analysis. It is because of this that the development of secondary autonomy can be made fruitful for the study of those phenomena of overlapping and of ramification which I have just mentioned.

I return to the problem of the incidental effects of interpretation, which frequently transcend our immediate concern with the specific drive-defense setup under consideration, and which are not always predictable. In trying to account in a general way for these and related observations stemming from various clinical sources, we assume that the process set in motion by a stimulus (interpretation being only one instance in question) produces not only, so to speak, 'local' reactions. It goes beyond the stimulated 'area', changing the balance of mental energies and affecting a variety of aspects of the dynamic system. This process activates or sets in a state of preparedness elements functionally and genetically connected with it; its appeal often reaches from one system into the others, and its unconscious side effects may transcend the barriers of countercathexis. It would, however, be rash to assume that these 'connections' can always be fully understood in terms of the principles of mere associationism. In contrast to the associationist

approach, we imply the presence not only of dynamic but also of structural factors. Also, psychoanalysis, while often using the language of associationism, has from the very first differed from it and does so even more since principles of organization and structure have explicitly become an essential part of our theory.

What I have in mind could be designated briefly as the 'principle of multiple appeal'. I wish to introduce this approach tentatively, without discussing alternative propositions. A somewhat similar physiological conception has been advanced by brain physiologists, some of whom use the term 'resonance effect'. I also want to mention that Federn (14), to some extent, thought along similar lines in trying to prove his point that there is, in the brain, conduction not based on neural pathways—which, however, has no immediate bearing on our problem.

In considering changes in cathexis less as isolated phenomena, but rather as occurring in a 'field', we are in agreement with a trend in modern science that has proved its fruitfulness in a great variety of domains. I think that as to the phenomena considered here, the introduction of the field concept may facilitate understanding. But I must add that to translate the whole of analytical psychology into field psychology seems hardly feasible without doing it considerable violence—despite the repeated demands voiced by representatives of field theory in psychology.

As in this short paper I have touched on a long list of subjects, I shall summarize. In comparing theoretical and technical development, I believe that the lag today is rather on the side of

technique. In the process of gradual replacement of the older layer concepts by structural concepts, not all the implications have so far been realized. One example is given of how the gradual realization of structural thinking has evolved and helped toward a better understanding and a better utilization of analytical material, in discussing the structural implications of speech and language in analysis. On the technical

side, our technique of interpretation has so far been better understood and made more explicit in its dynamic and economic than in its structural aspects. Certain incidental effects of interpretation which, though familiar to all of us, have not yet been taken sufficiently into account by our theory or technique, need closer investigation. In concluding I try to show that it may prove useful to view certain related problems of psychoanalytic psychology from the angle of a principle of 'multiple appeal'.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTION AND TREATMENT OF THE NEUROSES

SANDOR RADO

During the past few years we have witnessed rapid progress in general medicine culminating in the recent advances in the chemotherapy of infectious diseases. In view of this bright picture in our neighbor's field it is fitting to ask ourselves whether we too are in a position to report improvements. The purpose of my paper is to show that we are, although in our field developments have been slower and less spectacular.

Although mental healing is the oldest kind of healing, scientific psychotherapy is a very young branch of medicine. It was only some forty years ago that Freud laid its foundations by the discovery of a method for the penetrating psychological investigation of mental life. The essence of this method was, and still is, to maintain a special kind of psychological contact with the patient over an extended period and by certain technical means enable him to unfold himself mentally before the eyes of the physician. This procedure of prolonged observation however was more than a method of investigation. It appeared itself to have a therapeutic effect which could be directed and intensified by skilful influence. In medical practice it has been employed ever since that time for its value as a means of treatment.

Freud summed up the early results of his psychoanalytic studies in two closely interrelated formulations based on the hypothesis of instinctual drives. According to the first formulation, neurotic symptoms are due to the repression of instinctual drives during the period of childhood; the drives thus repressed are excluded from normal development yet they

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remain powerful and produce the derivative manifestations which we encounter as symptoms. The second formulation stated that the psychoanalytic procedure remedies the symptoms by inducing the patient to overcome his resistances—the repressing forces in his mind—thus allowing the repressed pathogenic unconscious in him to become conscious again. In spite of the many complicated details that were later added, these twin formulations have remained the foundation upon which psychoanalytic work has been carried out.

In accord with these formulations the practicing analyst focused his attention upon the abundant fantasy productions of the patient. These fantasies were seen as forming the mental background of his neurotic symptoms and behavior; they were considered the flagrant manifestations of his hitherto repressed and unconscious drives. Their production was therefore encouraged. The analytic procedure was to retrace these fantasies to early infantile experiences of the patient. As a rule he could be shown that in his fantasies and symptoms he had revived and repeated his remote past and was reverting to the primitive instinctual gratifications of that time. Sometimes tangible improvements followed this type of analytic work; in other cases no improvement was forthcoming. It was then disquieting to find that neurotic fantasies and symptoms are like the heads of the fabled hydra any of which when cut off was replaced by two others unless a fire brand were used to scorch the growth. Unfortunately we had no formula for such cauterization.

The capriciousness of our therapeutic results puzzled us. It required years of clinical study and the repeated revision of our working assumptions to bring us closer to a solution. The first move in these developments was made by Freud. In his book *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, published in 1926, he reëxamined his theory of the pathogenesis of the neuroses (1). Here he

reversed his previous conception that the repression of instinctual drives leads to anxiety, holding that on the contrary anxiety leads to the repression of instinctual drives. He came to the conclusion that *anxiety* was the decisive factor in

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the causation of the neuroses. In his own words: 'Whence springs the preference over all other affects which the affect of anxiety seems to enjoy in *alone evoking reactions which we distinguish from others as abnormal* and which in their inexpediency obstruct the stream of life?'

From this recognition of the dominant rôle played by anxiety in the pathology of the neuroses Freud, astonishingly, drew no conclusions for the technique of treatment. Other authors, especially Ferenczi and Wilhelm Reich, attempted to do so during the ensuing years but without conclusive results. My own therapeutic efforts gradually led me to realize that we had reached a stage of development when our understanding of the etiology and treatment of the neuroses was hindered rather than aided by the theory of instincts itself. This theory was repeatedly modified by Freud, each time becoming more speculative, more general and remote. Although captivated by the philosophical implications of this theory, Freud was aware of its scientific shortcomings. He wrote in 1933: 'The theory of instincts is, as it were, our mythology. The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefiniteness.' (2) Obviously this hypothesis, though of great heuristic value in the early development of psychoanalysis, has outlived its usefulness. If Freud's discoveries were to bear new fruits by stimulating further scientific inquiry, it was necessary to segregate the factual findings of psychoanalysis from its metaphysical elements and to build some other frame of reference that would rest on our established biological knowledge of man and suit our medical needs.

We attempted to meet this need by describing the actually observable dynamics of the mind in terms of integrative ego functioning or to introduce a convenient designation, in terms of an *egology*.[1] This egological concept has gradually evolved from a theoretical position first stated in 1927 and further elaborated in 1933. (3) It has enabled us to look upon the

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[1]Integrative ego functioning is of course the integrative functioning of the 'total personality'. The latter term is avoided because of the somewhat metaphysical content that it has been made to represent.

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neuroses as disorders of integrative ego functioning and thus to study and describe them in terms of an *ego pathology*. The results of our attempt have been presented elsewhere (4) and will be published. Here I shall merely indicate the few points needed to clarify the problem of treatment.

The first task was to learn more about anxiety, and also to arrive at a closer definition of our terms, making a sharp distinction between the affect of anxiety and the state of fear or apprehension. Fear (apprehension) is marked by a highly intellectual content, a specific feeling tone, and the absence of peripheral motor manifestations. Hence fear (apprehension) is not an affect but a predominantly intellectual state of mind.[2] Its general characteristic is alertness to danger; egological analysis however reveals its essential substance to be *anticipation of pain from impending injury*. Pain and injury must of course be understood to include purely mental as well as physical experiences. In anxiety, on the other hand, the intellectual element is negligible, though it too is perceived as a specific feeling (related to fear). The decisive component from which it derives its character as an affect is its specific peripheral motor manifestations centered around a sudden and transitory impediment of breathing.

The outstanding fact in regard to fear and anxiety as well as pain is that they are the key devices of a safety function of the ego which I propose to call *emergency control* (5). These devices act on the ego in a definite way; they prompt it reactively to *emergency measures*, such as quick emergency moves, elaborate emergency fortifications and finally reparative adjustments. Here I

shall mention only the emergency moves. They are: the outward operations of flight or evasion; the release of anger or rage resulting in the outward operations of combat; the purely intellectual move of 'choosing the lesser evil'; and last, the inward inhibitory impulses, the operations of self-control. The latter restrains the ego in cases where it would otherwise expose itself to emergencies and must therefore be

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considered the prophylactic branch of emergency control. All this is readily observed in the normal ego.

Anxiety is a reflex-like response. We may refer to it as the *anxiety reflex*. The ways in which this reflex is elicited in the newly born infant are obscure but we see that it undergoes a definite development in early childhood. This development falls into two stages. In the first, experience and training tend to condition it to become responsive only to sense perceptions which truly indicate that the ego is exposed to injury, in other words that there exists a state of actual emergency. With this process of early conditioning an attempt is made to enable the anxiety reflex, inherited from our subhuman ancestors, to serve as a device of emergency control under the conditions of civilization. The control then to be fully adequate should function according to the following pattern: sense perceptions truly representative of emergency (of impending injury) reflexly evoke anxiety whose action in turn prompts the ego to reactive emergency measures.

This aim however can only be realized in the second stage when the development of the child permits the fuller enlistment for this purpose of its intellectual function. The anxiety reflex is then gradually transformed into and superseded by the higher *fear reflex*. The vital point in this change is the *anxiety affect*; whereas its feeling tone remains unchanged, its motor elements are replaced by the intellectual components characteristic of fear. Upon completion of this metamorphosis then, the devices of emergency control, originally pain and anxiety, have become pain and fear. With the evolution of fear anxiety has withered away.

It is a symptom of abnormal development if the evolution of the fear reflex from the anxiety reflex is not a full transformation but merely a branching out. Though the fear reflex develops, the anxiety reflex also persists and far from dwindling away, shows signs of increasing strength. Its reflex excitability increases; its affect manifestations expand. If elicited, the reflex no longer manifests itself as a *flash* of anxiety but as an *attack* of anxiety. The former served as a stimulant

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to useful action; the anxiety attack, on the contrary, has a paralyzing effect on the ego, sometimes to the point of complete incapacitation. Previously a serviceable device of emergency control, the anxiety reflex has by its survival and hypertrophy become a menace to the ego.

Henceforth the ego will be subject to attacks of anxiety. These attacks seem to occur first as an added affect manifestation in real emergencies where the normal child would respond only with fear. Later however, they arise independently of such occasions. Our investigations have recently begun to shed light on the chain of internal events responsible for this momentous change, events which of course remain hidden from the ego itself.

After experiencing a few anxiety attacks the ego begins to dread their recurrence. In its desperate efforts to prevent them it has only the intellectual resources of fear at its disposal. For want of better insight the ego will trace its attacks of anxiety to imagined causes and henceforth will be afraid of these. In other words, it now dramatizes anxiety in terms of morbid fears. During the further course of childhood development both the anxiety attacks and the morbid fears sustained by them may subside. It is then in typical situations in the period of puberty and later in maturity that they recur. Though the content of the morbid fears is now colored by contemporary elements, they are easily revealed as revivals of the fears formed in childhood.

The significance of the morbid fears can hardly be overrated; it becomes apparent when one realizes that the ego reacts to them in essentially the same way as to ordinary fear. Under their pressure the ego though actually in no danger, fights, retreats, fortifies and readjusts itself, exhausting itself in superfluous emergency measures. These measures are the decisive factors in the development of the neuroses. They carry the disturbance set up by the anxiety attacks into the individual functions of the ego. The manifold details of these measures have been gradually disclosed by the minute analysis of a large variety of cases. Clinical findings have demonstrated

the validity of the following conception: *neurosis is ego functioning altered by faulty measures of emergency control*. In the pathogenesis of neurosis the first observable event is a disturbance in the development of the fear reflex resulting in the survival of the anxiety reflex and the expansion of its affect manifestations to attacks; in the effort to control anxiety attacks the ego generates morbid fears and is then pushed by these into faulty emergency measures which invade and upset any or all of its functions.

The ego however is unconscious of the true meaning and source of its neurotic manifestations. Such a striking lack of self-awareness may seem astonishing. However closer observation reveals that the normal ego behaves in a similar fashion in regard to its realistic fears. Its behavior may be definitely motivated by fear of which it neither is nor dares to be conscious. One is forced to realize that it is precisely because of their intimidating and humiliating side effects that the ego shies from a consciousness of its fears, though wholly under their domination. It is no longer surprising then that it should be unaware of the nature of the complicated operations deriving from this unrecognized source.

The neurotic ego is thus driven by its morbid fears blindly to carry out unnecessary emergency measures which reduce both the range and the efficiency of its functioning. The damage is particularly serious if the disturbing influences of morbid self-control invade the delicate physiological mechanism of organ functions, depriving the ego of its due command of the organs. This is notably the case in disturbances of the genital function, an element rarely absent in any neurosis. Though the development of this function is completed only in puberty, its finer coördinations are unbalanced under the impact of anxiety in early childhood. Also to be emphasized as another fairly constant feature in the neuroses is one that has not been given the attention to which it is entitled by its practical importance. I am referring to the disturbances of the group membership functions of the ego which include the individual's capacity for and way of doing his share

of work in the community, and his handling of the competitive aspects of life. Since our knowledge of these functions themselves is incomplete, their disturbances are as yet somewhat obscure; but here too our approach has led to clarification.

Strangest of all however, are those actions of the neurotic ego which are obviously self-injurious. We have gradually come to understand these phenomena as the outcome of morbid fears under whose pressure the ego often brings down on itself the very injury which formed the imaginary object of its fear. A woman has a wholly unwarranted fear of being slighted and ignored; unwittingly she displays a resentful attitude which will lead to her being avoided in fact. The morbid fear of being persecuted drives many into actions that bring about their actual persecution. The sexual life of neurotics is full of self-injuries inflicted in this way. Once an ego has come to the point of coping with its anxiety by producing and sustaining morbid fears, the consequences are far-reaching indeed. Yet this mechanism alone far from explains all the spectacular self-injuries involved in the neuroses. Further insight into them was gained with the realization that emergency control is integrated on three hierarchic levels. On the highest, the intellectual level, its device is fear; on the next, the subintellectual or affectomotor level, its device is anxiety; and on the lowest, subaffect level its device is pain. These superimposed levels of integration possibly reflect the course of phylogenetic development. Fear is

anticipation of pain, eliciting efforts to avert the impending injury. The flash of anxiety is a cruder device for the same purpose. On the lowest level of organization pain cannot yet be foreseen and thus averted, but must none the less be dealt with when it occurs. Control of pain is therefore directed toward eliminating the source of suffering, if necessary even by the sacrifice of a part of one's own body. Such conduct reveals a principle ingrained in the organization of all animals, including man. In the phylogenetic scale of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization there gradually become apparent many reflexes designed to eliminate pain-causing agents from the surface or inside of the body. The

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scratch reflex, the shedding of tears, sneezing, coughing, spitting, vomiting, colic bowel movement are but a few well-known instances of this principle of pain control in our bodily organization. This principle I have called the *riddance principle*, and its physiological embodiments the *riddance reflexes*. Reverting to the voluntary operations of ego functioning, we may observe in ourselves an impulse to tear away an intolerably aching portion of the body: a tooth, an ear, a finger, etc.

The decisive step came with the recognition that the same basic riddance principle governs the ego's attitude toward mental pain, toward the torment caused by its morbid fears and anxieties. For example: when the morbid fears responsible for sexual incapacitation have become intolerable, the individual develops the impulse to rid himself of this organ which appears to be the cause of his distress. Such primeval impulses of emergency control are checked by the intellectual realization that their pursuit would harm rather than benefit the ego, or more frequently these impulses are automatically repressed. In the latter case no less than in the former is the effect upon the ego tremendous. The ego cannot escape a faint awareness of being impelled toward the very injuries it dreads, and its fears feed and grow on this awareness. A vicious circle is then established: the fears thus intensified reflexly turn back on and stimulate the deep-seated riddance impulses which in turn magnify the severity and painfulness of the fears. Once this mechanism has been set in motion, the outlook for the further course of the neurosis is indeed alarming. The patient moves from defeat to defeat. In other cases, in psychoses or under morbid excitement, he loses his controlling insight and in a paroxysm of riddance, actually inflicts self-injury in order to end the insupportably painful tension of anticipation (6). In some cases, driven to end the tension, the patient brings about a situation in which he is inevitably injured by others. A refined technique of achieving this is to lure the surgeon into the performance of unnecessary operations.

It was the disclosure of the riddance principle that finally led me to feel that the attempt to understand the neuroses in

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egological terms of emergency control was fully justified and offered a promising approach. It was a great satisfaction to me to be able to demonstrate in a crucial problem of psychopathology that voluntary operations of integrative ego functioning are governed by the same principles embodied in the ego's reflex organization.

Leaving many important points untouched, we must now return to the problem of neurotic fantasies. Whereas until now we have been concerned mainly with the devices of emergency control and the corresponding emergency moves, in dealing with neurotic fantasies we touch on those other elements of emergency control that we have called fortifications and reparative adjustments. We regard these fantasies as illusory operations acting vicariously for inhibited normal operations. The greater the pleasure deficiency of the functionally crippled ego, the greater its tendency to indulge in wishful fantasies. This is but one instance of the ego's effort to increase its working equipment by the revival of the magic operations of childhood, a morbid act of fortification that takes place on a large scale in every neurosis. Yet these illusory operations are themselves not immune from the inhibitory action of morbid fear and anxiety, and the ego is therefore obliged even here to retreat and make its reparative adjustments.

We need not go further into these details. The point to be stressed here is that neurotic fantasies are vicarious operations. Our first task then is to retrace them to the operations one would find in their place had the ego remained normal and to use them as an indication of the forces interfering with the ego's normal functioning. The same is true in regard to the other symptoms which owe their existence to the reparative efforts of the neurotic ego to open up inferior sources of pleasure and profit as a compensation. In this procedure, instead of allowing ourselves to be sidetracked to the secondary consequences of the disturbance we use the fantasies and symptoms together with other data to direct attention to those focal points where the chain of pathological events actually originates. We can restore to normality functions damaged by anxiety only by removing the obstacle of anxiety from their range. This implies incessant study of the disturbed functions themselves rather than of the functions that have come to act vicariously for them, and the careful disclosure of the manifold damage done to their structure by anxiety. Gradually unfolding the patient's life history in terms of his intimidation we arrive inescapably at his early childhood when the first impact of anxiety on functions not yet fully developed laid the foundations for their future disturbances.

This reorientation of therapeutic work unfortunately does not lessen the time needed for treatment, and demands if possible even keener penetration than before into the patient's present and past, but it does reward us with a greater measure of success.

I have been able to present only a fragmentary picture of developments in our field. Foremost among the many other subjects that are ready to be reported is the better understanding, in the light of integrative ego functioning, of the phenomenon known as transference and the utilization of this insight in the technique of treatment. The discussion of these subjects however must await another occasion.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF ENTROPY AND THE DEATH INSTINCT

SIEGFRIED BERNFELD and SERGEI FEITELBERG

In the psycho-analytical theory of instincts the death instinct occupies a peculiar position. Some psycho-analysts are of opinion that it is entirely superfluous, while others make use of it as of a notion based on proved clinical experience. Freud constantly reiterates that this notion is conjectural, [1] and he holds that we must not regard the instincts of death or Eros as ranking with the other propositions he has laid down in his theory of the libido. In his view, with the assumption of the death instinct that theory enters the realm of speculation, for here it oversteps the boundaries of psychological or psycho-analytical methods, since the notions of the death instinct and Eros purport to embrace biological facts—indeed, the universal behaviour of nature (the stability principle). Many uncertainties, confusions and errors arise from the circumstance that we do not always sufficiently distinguish between the different meanings attached to the one word: 'instinct' [1].

As we know, from the psychological standpoint—i.e. as concrete forces within the personality (id, ego and superego)—Freud differentiates the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction. In antithesis to these stand the speculative biological notions of Eros and the death instinct, by which we mean not so much forces within the personality, but the most universal behaviour of living substance. They are principles, or, if you like, natural forces, but not instincts in the narrower sense of the word. The term 'death instinct' denotes the fact that everything living is of limited duration, has a beginning and an end, and it represents the course of life as the restoration of the inanimate state in which life originated. 'Eros' denotes the constant prolonging of life through reproduction and the aggregation of ever-greater organic masses in increasingly complicated unities. This clear distinction between the 'speculative' (biological) and the psychological standpoint has been frequently emphasized by Freud; nevertheless, it is still possible for misunderstandings to occur because he

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[1] Not only in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* [11], but also, e.g. in [12].

now seeks to abolish this differentiation by enunciating a fundamental principle. He tries to connect the two instincts (the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction) with the extrapsychic natural forces (Eros and the death instinct). He looks for analogies for the two last within the ego and discovers there Eros, in operation as the sexual instinct, and the death instinct operating as the instinct of destruction. It is this idea which really belongs to the realm of theory and which is, on the one hand, rejected as empty speculation, and, on the other, employed uncritically as a proved fact.

Now that Freud has overstepped the boundaries of psycho-analysis, not only in the direction of biology, but also in that of physics, [2] it is the more urgently important to decide whether in his speculation he is misusing an analogy which takes us nowhere or whether he has introduced into biology and psychology a new natural scientific theory. For he expressly emphasizes the fact that he is identifying the death instinct with the general principle of stability in nature [II].

The decision is especially important for our theoretical study of the psychology of energy and instinct. In this connection we might borrow a criterion from the methodology of the natural sciences and say that similarities between physical, biological and psychic processes may be appraised as more than mere analogies if they can be demonstrated to be special cases of some more comprehensive natural law.

Freud states clearly that he regards the death instinct as the special biological case of the principle of stability [II]. The pleasure principle, which subserves the death instinct, is presumably the psychological special case of that principle. Opponents of Freud's theory of the death instinct, who scent mysticism and religion in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, have entirely overlooked this fact. The conjunction of physical, biological, physiological and psychological facts and laws is neither inadmissible, 'unscientific', nor (as has actually been suggested) meaningless. It depends altogether on whether we have any concrete success in demonstrating that a hitherto unknown case comes under a general law; but endeavours in this direction by no means deserve to be dismissed as speculative or as *a priori* inadmissible from the standpoint of methodology.

How far removed the Freudian conception is from mere physico-psychological analogy is shewn by that important part of his theory of

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[2]And of late also of the history of cultural development [15].

[3][In a previous paper (Imago, B. XVI, p. 66) the authors divide the organism into two systems: (1) central apparatus, which is roughly the same as the central nervous system (system P); (2) system of cells (system C), which consists of the rest of the body. In a unicellular organism these systems are represented by the nucleus and the cytoplasm.—Translator's Note.]

the death instinct which represents the pleasure principle as a special case of that instinct, shall we say on the level of the system P.[3] What is remarkable about this hypothesis is, surely, just that it unifies apparent opposites, not things analogous. Self-observation and naïve perception and evaluation discern in death and pleasure merely irreconcilable opposites. Freud maintains that there exists a hidden functional connection between these two apparently entirely heteronomous spheres.

It cannot, of course, be maintained that he has proved this. It is not, however, his purpose merely to announce dogmatically a paradoxical and bewildering theory; on the contrary, he develops it into a true working hypothesis in the following sentences: 'The pleasure principle seems directly to subserve the death instincts. … At this point innumerable other questions arise to which no answer can be given. We must be patient and wait for other means and opportunities for investigation' [II, p. 83].

Let us now see whether the conceptions of a dual system and its energies propounded by us [3], [4], [5] will help to corroborate these ideas of Freud's in some respects.

He takes as his starting-point the principle of stability, but in our view this does not formulate with sufficient precision or concreteness the facts intended to be conveyed. In its most recent form, that adopted by Petzold, it runs as follows: 'Every system left to itself and in process of development ultimately terminates in a state of more or less permanence, or at least in a state which either no longer contains the inherent conditions for further change or else contains them, at any rate over a long period of time, only to a negligible extent' [16, p. 241]. Whether we accept this formulation or the very similar one by Fechner or Spencer [6], what is connoted by the principle of stability is simply this: that all movement and, indeed, all change are of limited duration. Leaving aside a possible philosophical content, this statement scarcely advances us beyond the confines of naïve knowledge. Nor do we gain anything by drawing an analogy between the states of repose and death,

the formula then being that everything set in motion leads to death. The value of the principle is still further diminished by the reflection that motion and rest, life and death, are concepts of relative significance and can never be grasped except in reference to a given system in relation to other systems, or else in reference to a particular level in a given system. Thus the 'macrocosmic' repose of a stone which has just fallen to the ground connotes intensified

movements of a 'microcosmic' nature (thermal motion of the molecules), and the state of repose in a sleeping human being implies repose in the system P but intensified activity (growth) of the integrated systems C. Rest and motion, life and death, cannot be defined with precision at all, i.e. they are dialectical opposites. So long as we deduce from them universal modes of behaviour, we remain in the realm of philosophy.

The facts connoted by the principle of stability find pregnant and concrete formulation in the theory of energy. We shall not discuss whether this theory exhausts the content of the stability principle in its physical aspect. We will confine ourselves to the theory of energy because it has sufficient theoretical substantiation and because it must be considered first of all when we are dealing with our psycho-analytical problem. This theory includes the quantity and trend of those changes which are the subject of the stability principle, and it formulates quite plainly the condition which, in terms of that principle, is called indefinitely 'repose' or 'death'. The second main thesis of the theory of energy is this: that all physical processes in any isolated system have a definite trend, namely, towards the equalization of the different intensities [*Intensität*] of the system's energies; a state is aimed at in which such differences no longer exist, that is to say, a state also in which no movement can any longer take place by means of endosystemic factors alone. Such an ultimate cancelling out occurs only when differences in *temperature* are equalized (when *mechanical* differences of intensity are equalized, oscillations arise which, in the process of equalization, create fresh differences); hence, what the second main thesis affirms is that this maximum state of repose can occur only when all the energies have been converted into heat.

This state to which every isolated system (and so, perhaps, the whole universe) tends acquires the maximum durability, for it must last as long as the isolation of the system (of the universe) lasts. But, even here, there can be no talk of a state of absolute repose, for the 'microcosmic' thermal oscillations of the molecules persist. On account of the macrocosmic permanent rigidity of the system in its

'ultimate state' it has been held to be analogous to death and termed 'thermal death'. A more exact term is 'the more probable state' (Boltzmann), and the measure of this is called *entropy*. Henceforward we will give this second principle of the theory of energy the not wholly accurate but concise name of the entropy principle and speak of the entropy law or the tendency to entropy.

Interesting philosophical discussions have taken place on 'thermal death', and the attempt has been made to prove that it is not inevitable, or at least to leave open the possibility that it may not involve the death of living matter. In support of this view Stern [19], [20] has cited in a brilliant passage Fechner's law, which, he says, represents the most favourable situation that we can conceive of for organisms which are endeavouring to maintain themselves in spite of constantly diminishing differences of intensity in their environment. Fechner's law makes organisms dependent not on the absolute but the relative degree of the differences in intensity; hence it is possible for them to exist up to the point of zero. In recent times the most important attempt to handle the problem has been made by Nernst [18], who endeavours, with the help of new findings in physics, to prove that it is inadmissible to apply the entropy law to the universe. We may spare ourselves this discussion, for we are concerned exclusively with systems which are finite in space and time. To these, however, applies the third principle of thermodynamics, the theorem of Nernst, according to which it is not possible to reach zero in finite systems. It is true that in a concrete system all differences in the intensity of energy may be equalized, so that there exists in it only more thermal energy; but it is impossible by means of any exosystemic influence wholly to withdraw this energy from the system and thus reduce its temperature to absolute zero. Accordingly, although from the macrocosmic standpoint absolute repose is attainable, there is bound up with it a corresponding increase in microcosmic (molecular) motion, and this can never be wholly destroyed. Absolute repose is unattainable.

Our discussion of the death instinct will be more fruitful if we take as our starting point not the stability principle, but the entropy principle. The first question we must ask is whether the death instinct can be conceived of as a special case of the latter principle in the realm of organic process.

There is no need for me to prove here that this is the trend of Freud's argument; but I must point out that, even if it be demonstrated that the entropy principle is identical with the death instinct

and death with the 'probable state', his train of thought would not be exhausted. For with the death instinct the historical character of all instincts plays an important part, and Freud holds outright that this instinct represents the striving of organic substance to return to the *earlier* state of inanimate matter. In a consideration of dynamics this historical factor must be disregarded. This is self-evident, but by emphasizing it afresh we may guard against confusion with the Ostwaldian or similar natural philosophy and escape the reproach of substituting physics for psychology.

To adduce the required proof is, of course, beyond our scope, for biology and physiology to-day have not yet progressed beyond the rudiments of a dynamics of the life-process. Nevertheless, it is certain that the processes of life are fixed. It is characteristic of such processes that certain conditions within the system compel the transformation of energy to follow a cyclical course, so that the initial phase is constantly reached again. So long as the exosystemic accession of energy is ensured and so long as the conditions within the system which cause the cycle remain unchanged, the fixed system endures. 'Death' occurs only as an accident in functioning. Many biologists do, in fact, hold this view. The life-processes themselves (apart from traumatic injuries) produce a progressive deterioration of the 'machine', and this, when the so-called necrobiotic processes have reached a certain point, results in the final impairment of the conditions of the cycle, i.e. in death. 'Death is evolved from life' [20, p. 160]. We must conceive of death as in some sense a functional accident which, from birth on, is gradually prepared for by deficiencies of functioning. It is inevitable, because the conditions of the cycle are very complicated and the factor of safety in the machine is indeed low; but, in principle, it is merely an accident, an inadequacy.

'Death as an incident', as Ehrenberg says [8, p. 29] —the isolated process of dying in the individual—would, according to this view, not subserve entropy. 'Death no more furnishes energy than does the breaking of an electric current' [8, p. 29 ff]. Yet it must be pointed out that the result of death is the dissolution of the system, i.e. that at death considerable differences of intensity between the system and the environment arise, which during life (indeed, precisely by means of life) were compensated. All the same it is true that, after a certain period, dissolution results in their ultimate equalization, which life prevented. These contradictions can be explained if we make use of our concept of the individual as a dual system. We differentiate the

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[4]Moreover, the same statement seems to apply to the living system C which is also a dual system (plasm and nucleus) of a lower order, whose death is brought about by cariolysis.

[5]An observation by Crile [7, p. 536] seems actually to indicate the contrary, for after death the electrical potential difference between brain and body, which at the moment of death had the value O, rises again.

processes in the cells (system C) from those in system P. Death is an incident which overtakes the latter system and destroys its regulating function, with which is inseparably bound up the existence of the cells which now undergo dissolution. Of course this accelerates the attainment of equilibrium in system C, which becomes subject to the laws of physics instead of those of life. For system C the death of its superior system signifies accelerated equalization; the death of system P, we may say for the moment, 'subserves the entropy' of the cells. For the entropy of system P (i.e. for the height of its potential = difference of intensity between the central

apparatus and the body) no concrete significance can be attributed to death, because what death annihilates is precisely the relation between the parts of the dual system.[4] The system P keeps the common reckoning of energy for the cells and endeavours to hold the 'balance of energy' steady. At the moment when the death of the system occurs, it is futile to ask whether the accounts balance, for they no longer exist. The cells appropriate the balance and each keeps its own account, which the physicist can check by his measurements. Thus the question is not whether the death of system P signifies an increase of entropy in that system, [5] but whether life has the function of increasing the entropy of it.

If the death instinct is to be conceived of as an instinct at all after the incident which we call 'the death of an individual', it cannot be held to be a special organic case of the entropy principle, but (and this is Freud's opinion) it must be historically determined, like all genuine instincts.

Nevertheless, from the dynamic standpoint the dictum that for the living organism 'the goal of all life is death' has ample justification if the concepts in question are suitably defined. It is gratifying to be able to quote a biologist in this connection.

Ehrenberg builds up a biological theory upon the basic idea of the irreversibility of the elementary life-processes. Life consists in a continuous structural process, the growth of substance at the expense

of fluid; it consists of the utilizing of energy-intensities to build up substance from which no more work can be extracted, which is partly secreted from the body and partly precipitated within it as cell-nucleus structure (apparatus structure). The structural substance (e.g. the cell-nucleus) determines the velocity, intensity, etc., of the subsequent life-processes. It is this metabolism, this substance-formation, this dying which constitutes life. What we call the life of an individual is the integration of countless elementary life-processes to form a unity determined by the structures which produce those processes. Every individual elementary life-process leads to the irreversible binding of the energies in structure, i.e. to 'death'. The life of the individual aims at the filling of the 'vital space' with structure; its intensity and duration are determined by the gradient between the vital space and the amount of structure it contains. At any point before the end (which can probably never be reached) the 'incident of death' may bring the process life-death to a standstill.

Freud ascribes to organic substance the tendency to strive after stable conditions and to achieve lasting states of repose, and he calls the agent which executes this tendency the 'death instinct'; it seems that we may not unreasonably anticipate that biology and physiology, as they advance, will adduce cogent evidence that this tendency is the special case of the entropy principle for organic systems. The death instinct (using the term in the sense attached to it in biological theory) is, if we leave aside the historical factor, rightly regarded from the standpoint of dynamics as a scientific and not a merely speculative hypothesis. Of course the words 'death' and 'instinct' do give prominence to the historic factors in the behaviour of a system, and this easily leads to misunderstanding. We should probably therefore be wise, when considering the death instinct in this sense (which is entirely in accordance with Freud's view), to reserve for it the term 'Nirvana principle' [10].

The attempt to see in the pleasure principle the psychological special case of the entropy principle must for the moment remain at a very rudimentary stage of theory. If we should succeed in evolving satisfactory methods for measuring the libido, we should no doubt be able to arrive at an exact proof of this hypothesis, arguing from the principles of psycho-analytical psychology. Freud has repeatedly shown that the problems of the pleasure principle are *quantitative* and ranks them as a separate economic standpoint. According to his economic hypothesis, pleasure is experienced when quantities of

excitation within the psychic system are diminished and pain when they are increased. He does not overlook the fact that this experience does not depend on the absolute quantities and that

possibly the quality of the tension plays a part [12]. If we could demonstrate experimentally that these quantities of excitation and tension represented quantities of energy, we could prove that the decisive part of the individual's whole behaviour is regulated by the entropy principle [12].

Our first attempt at an experimental computation of libido [5] testifies clearly to the correctness of Freud's theory of pleasure, provided that we guard against vague analogies in our discussion. According to our findings, the potential of the individual is raised in the state of repose (sleep), hence repose does not represent increased entropy; on the contrary, the differences in intensity are considerably augmented. To try to draw an analogy between repose and 'entropy' would result unfavourably for the psycho-analytical theory of instinct. But the state of repose of system P must not be construed as a state of physical equalization of account of the phenomenon of rest. It is obvious that, during sleep, system P is to a great extent eliminated. Directly the individual awakes and motor actions occur, which are regulated by system P, the potential is lowered. Whilst retaining the notion that P is a superior system, we may assert that its function is to lower, and keep low, the potential, which rises as soon as P is eliminated. This elimination (the state of repose) produces a dynamic situation in opposition to the principle of entropy: hence system P 'subserves entropy'.

In one of the sleep-curves plotted by Mosso [5, p. 180] we see that in restless sleep, talking during sleep, etc., there is always a decrease in the temperature-difference (which, according to our view, is a factor of the potential). We cannot immediately reject the supposition that the lowering of the potential during the state of repose corresponds to dreaming. In dreams the system P once more comes partly into play, its function being to guard sleep. Without anticipating future experiments, we might conjecture that this is another proof that system P operates to increase entropy. We thus arrive at the notion (which is in accordance with the practical findings, if not with the theories, of the biology and physiology of sleep) that out of the lively metabolism of the cells during sleep there accumulates a considerable measure of potential difference, which presses to be lowered. The individual awakes, the energies are personalized [4] and are diminished by the psychic work performed during the waking state. We may even say

that spontaneous waking occurs because the potential has become too high. The curves of sleep and narcosis [5, p. 181] do indeed show that, with awaking, the potential begins to be lowered. So, from this point of view also, partial awaking—dreaming—with its lowering of potential must be looked upon as 'guarding sleep'.

The waking, rested system has a large store of potential, while the exhausted system has a minimum. At first sight it seems from the dynamic point of view almost self-evident that potential is lowered by the working of system P; for work uses up energy. But when we realize that in the waking state a constant stream of energy flows into system P (e.g. through the process of perception), and when we remember that various considerations have forced us to conceive of muscular activities as not merely using up the energies of P (on the contrary, part of these energies is augmented by muscular action) [4, p. 112], the question arises how that system's function of lowering the potential is achieved. The waking, rested individual displays a lively inclination towards the stimuli and objects of its environment; it craves for stimulus and finds pleasure in the gratification of this craving. This mode of behaviour is especially characteristic of the sexual instincts, where it takes the form of attraction and attachment to an object; but we have evidence of it in connection with the instinct of destruction also. The result of this turning towards objects is that the system receives accessions of energy, and this seems the more unreasonable because it is just when the system is rested that it has a very high potential, whereas in a sleepy state with a low potential it cuts itself off from stimuli. At first it seems that the fact of the craving for stimulus is in direct contradiction to a tendency in the system P to keep the 'sum of excitation' as low as possible. Here we are faced with the same problem in the psychological aspect as the life-instinct presents to the Nirvana principle.[6]

If there is really a contradiction to the entropy principle here, the explanation must lie in the mechanical conditions of system P, and it must be only apparent and ultimately capable of solution. In the thermodynamic-osmotic model of the dual system P [4, p. 82] the potential difference between the sphere (central apparatus) and the

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[6]In our subsequent argument we shall modify and give a greater exactness to Bernfeld's argument [1] that the solution of the problem of craving for stimulus and delight in it lies in their agreement with the Nirvana principle.

cylinder (system C—'body') arises from the fact that the initial temperature of the former is lower than that of the latter. Autonomous equalization of temperature is impossible because the temperature of the cylinder is kept constant. It would appear that the easiest way to secure in the model a minimum of potential (the difference in temperature) would be to prevent fresh energy being conducted to the cylinder from outside. This is in accordance with the kindred psychological notion that through the avoidance of stimuli, i.e. through narcissistic isolation, the 'excitation-level' is kept low. But the potential can be kept constant through isolation in the model only, not in a living organism, for in the latter the potential is raised endosystemically. In the model the potential can be lowered only by conducting new energy to the cylinder which, according to the mechanical conditions, must be transferred to the sphere, so that its temperature is raised and the difference in temperature—the potential—between cylinder and sphere is diminished. The model's mode of functioning corresponds exactly to the apparently paradoxical behaviour of system P. Only if it receives fresh energy can its potential be lowered. This energy is conveyed by waking psychic activities and is guaranteed by the psychic phenomenon of the craving for stimulus. Libido directed towards the outer world, all the activities of self-preservation and many of those of the instinct of destruction, fulfil the dynamic function of lessening the difference of intensity in system P—lowering its potential. That is to say, they increase the entropy of that system. From the dynamic standpoint Freud's view that the life instincts pave the way to death is most exactly correct. The pleasure principle is the most general conscious regulator of the individual's behaviour. In its function of avoiding pain and achieving pleasure and in its modified development as the reality principle it accomplishes the lowering of the potential in accordance with the law of entropy. Through the pleasure principle the objects, actions and affects, which, dynamically regarded, are processes tending to raise the entropy of system P, become valuable for pleasure and for life itself. When the optimal entropy has been reached, that system has fulfilled its task and 'goes quietly to sleep'; its function is suspended. But when it ceases to operate to reduce the amount of energy, the potential once more is quickly raised to a degree which rouses system P to work again.

If, then, the experience of pleasure is associated with a lowering of potential and if this acts, as we may say, as a physical force, the

question arises how it comes about that pain is experienced at all or that there is any painful tension other than that of quite brief duration which is immediately cancelled by pleasure?

According to the view of Fechner and Freud, it would seem natural to include amongst painful experiences those processes in the system P which are contrary to the conditions of pleasure—that is to say, to assume that pain occurs when the potential of the system is raised. What are the conditions in the dual system under which the potential is thus raised for considerable periods, contrary to the 'natural trend' of the processes of nature?

In discussing perception we endeavoured to show [4, pp. 80 and 88 ff.] that through the operation of the intensities of the environment energy is conducted to system P and, through personalization, lowers that system's potential. This energy reaches the central apparatus through the sense-organs. The potential is lowered through the conducting of energy to the central apparatus and through its personalization, i.e. through the raising of the level of energy

in one part of the dual system. On the other hand, this conduction of energy depends on the difference of intensity between the cells and the central apparatus, and therefore on the presence of the potential. If the latter is considerably lowered it must entail difficulties in the mastering of the energies conducted to the system through external stimuli. The energy so conducted must remain in the sense-organ, in system C (in our model, the cylinder) and augment its intensity, thus raising the potential. It is evident, then, that the conception of a dual system enables us to interpret pain dynamically. Pain is associated with conditions in which the potential is low, as we assume it to be in fatigue before sleep. This is in accordance with our empirical knowledge, for it is characteristic of these states that stimuli are felt to be painful and the objects from which they proceed are shunned and eliminated from consciousness.

When the potential is high, the individual's behaviour is characterized by a readiness to turn towards objects and to desire them libidinally. So we could describe as narcissistic or as a flight from objects the state of minimal potential, in which stimuli and objects are shunned (in our model this state is represented by equality of temperature in the cylinder and the sphere). Dynamically we must conceive of the craving for stimulus and flight from objects as two easily differentiated modes of behaviour of system P. Both aim at the increase of entropy but under different mechanical conditions. From the discussion of the economics of energy in the dual system when the

potential is low, we gain some light on the question which had to be left open at the end of our second work [4]: painful conscious processes occur when there is a difficulty in augmenting the intensity in the central apparatus, i.e. in the transport of energy from the cells to that apparatus.

The reason why human life is accompanied by so much pain, in spite of the pleasure principle and the physical tendency to entropy which this safeguards, must be sought in the conditions of the dual system which, given a certain distribution of energy, may lead to temporary malfunctioning. That this possibility is, in fact, so abundantly realized due to all the social and psychological conditions and complications of natural processes, upon which psycho-analysis throws all the light we need. There are historical influences (ontogenetic and phylogenetic detours, and others imposed upon the individual by the conditions of his social station, which have now become historical) forbidding us many of those activities which would lead to a pleasurable equalizing of tensions. In a word, the restrictions of instinct which reality and the super-ego impose on the system P are the cause of the painful states so remarkably common and persistent.

It is very probable that constitutional factors, i.e. exceptional mechanical conditions, make it physiologically difficult to equalize the potential difference and so provide an opportunity for the excessive development of pain. Or they may permanently keep the potential difference very low, making the individual in question either chary of stimuli or over-sensitive to them, apathetic and narcissistically secluded in himself. Above all we should expect that any pathological structure of the central apparatus would be an important factor here (understanding by structure the energy-capacity in both senses of the term [4, p. 88 ff.]).

As far as it is possible to make an assertion before experimental psycho-analytical work has been done, it seems quite conceivable that the pleasure principle may be demonstrated to be a special case of the entropy principle on the level of system P.

But with this conclusion we have not reached the end of the task which we set before us in this paper, for Freud's argument to which, so far, we have exclusively adhered has hitherto had but little place in psycho-analytical discussion. When we speak of the death instinct, we are struck by a whole series of other elements in Freud's construction: above all, there is dying as an incident. We sometimes find

psycho-analytical writers expressing the view that the premature death of children, or even of adults, is a manifestation of their death instinct (cf. Ferenczi, 9). From the nature of the case

there can be no clinical proof of the correctness of this opinion, for it is part of the essence of the death instinct that it is not readily noticeable and sometimes cannot be detected at all. From the dynamic-economic standpoint it is impossible to decide whether this hypothesis is justified. As against it we may point out that, as we have shown, dying is not a concept which can be expressed in terms of dynamics, and that probably it cannot be adopted as an instinctual aim in the proper sense of the term. Freud has constantly asserted that dying and death cannot be instinctual aims for the id. Hence the question is only whether they represent an aim of the ego or a demand of the superego. Nevertheless, we would freely admit that a constant starvation of the erotic life or constant dissatisfaction and pain may have a very injurious effect upon the functioning power of system P. In suicide it certainly seems as though we had a direct manifestation of the 'death instinct'. Of course, in examining suicide analysis constantly reveals nothing else but complicated libidinal situations, implacable demands of the superego, identifications and, finally, a hatred of the subject's own ego or person, which feelings can usually be shown to have their origin in relations with objects. The mysterious factors in suicide, the intensity of the hate or other qualitative characteristics which are difficult to understand, possibly have not much to do with the final result: self-destruction. Like the corresponding factor of sadism these should probably be attributed rather to the instinct of destruction than to the death instinct (Nirvana principle).

But in psycho-analytical discussion it is just the instinct of destruction which constitutes the real difficulty. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud recognizes as the pleasure principle within the ego the death instinct of biological speculation (an idea to which, so far, we have confined our discussion). Since then, however, it has become increasingly clear that he is seeking to identify the death instinct with the instinct of destruction, and in his terminology the two are interchangeable. The question is whether it is justifiable so to identify them even from the dynamic-economic standpoint. We shall show that this is not so unless the death instinct which Freud identifies with the instinct of destruction has already acquired a meaning other than that attaching to the term in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where it is regarded as a special case of the stability principle. His writings of

recent years do not lead to any final decision on the point. But it is noteworthy that he accepts the death instinct (or instinct of destruction) as a psychological fact—a dynamic, and no longer an economic, fact. He does not attempt to describe it in terms of biological theory, nor does he link it up with the stability principle. He views it as a counterpart to the sexual instinct, but not in relation to the pleasure principle. We read, for instance: 'We must confess that it is more difficult for us to detect the latter [the death instinct] and to a great extent we can merely conjecture its existence as a background to Eros, also that it eludes us wherever it is not betrayed by a fusion with Eros' [15, p. 101].

The instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct give rise to two easily differentiated modes of behaviour of the individual in relation to his environment; undoubtedly they are to be construed as two different instincts. Instinct is the urge to restore a lost situation of gratification [11]. Though it is not possible to name with certainty any definite situation of this sort which can be attributed exclusively to either of these two instincts, yet on the whole the trend of the instinct of destruction is to recover gratification by annihilation of the environment and probably also by isolation of the subject from objects. The sexual instinct aims at attaining gratification by turning towards the environment and by retention of objects, i.e. by their preservation. Love is characteristic of the one instinct, hate of the other. They are certainly both of a biological nature, but not, like the death instinct, simply hypotheses in biological theory: these two easily distinguishable modes of behaviour may be demonstrated as concrete facts in the animal world also, right down to the protozoa. Freud observes that it was extraordinarily difficult for psycho-analysis to recognize the instinct of destruction [15], but it is for the biologist precisely the behaviour motivated by destruction which is an incontestable fact, while it is more difficult to discover love-activities not associated with a sexual instinct tinged with the tendency to destroy. Even when studying earliest infancy we see clearly that originally, in the first weeks of life, the

predominant behaviour is rejection of the stimuli of the environment, exclusion and 'hatred' of them [Bernfeld, 1]. When the environment gradually begins to become interesting and stimulating, the infant's first aim is to master it in order to annihilate or reject it orally; finally this urge to mastery issues in an active, aggressive, destructive phase which imparts to the child's pregenital development an obviously sadistic character. In

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[7]A more precise account cannot be given here of the reasons for the view which we are advocating and of which Bernfeld [1] has given a detailed exposition, namely, that a very close connection exists between narcissism and the instinct of destruction. In his work on Fascination [2] he shows that the preliminary phases of libidinal identification are conditioned by the suppression of motor activity (mastery). Perhaps if we follow this line of thought we shall be able to arrive at more concrete ideas about the energy of the instinct of death or destruction as contrasted with libidinal energy [15]. In the following remark Freud seems to hint at the affinity between narcissism and the instinct of destruction, on the one hand, and the process of binding with libido, on the other: 'But even where it shows itself without any sexual purpose, even in the blindest frenzy of destructiveness, one cannot ignore the fact that satisfaction of it is accompanied by an extraordinarily intense narcissistic enjoyment, due to the fulfilment it brings to the ego of its oldest omnipotence-wishes. The instinct of destruction, when tempered and harnessed (as it were, inhibited in its aim) and directed towards objects, is compelled to provide the ego with satisfaction of its needs and with power over nature' [15, p. 101]. Perhaps this affinity inspired Cohen-Kysper with the idea that the goal of the death instincts is repose and that they aim at lulling to rest … Eros, the disturber of the peace [6, p. 405].

Psychologie des Säuglings [1] all these facts are classified under a single heading according to the primal aim: that of restoring the repose of sleep, which has been interrupted by the disturbing values of the environment and by hunger-stimuli. To this group we give the name: 'repose instinct'. The term 'destruction instinct', however, describes subsequent development very much more clearly. This is the supremely conservative instinct which aims at preservation of the state of sleep—narcissistic repose—which feels and treats the world as an interruption to be escaped or annihilated. Ontogenetically the instinct of destruction as a guardian of sleep, as hunger, as an urge to mastery, is the earlier. It is in connection with the gratification of this instinct that the infant discovers the pleasure of the erotogenic zones and, through modification, restriction and transformation of the activities which it motivates, passes on to manifestations of tenderness and to libidinal object-attachment.[7]

The study of the sexual instinct and that of destruction (even if extended to include all living beings), the demonstration of the differences between the two, of their origin, mutual determinants, the development of their aims, the individual and secular evolution of the

means of gratification—all this lies within the sphere of the *qualitative*. These are problems which are germane to Freud's dynamic conception. Though the instincts may be characterized generally as being directed towards gratification, and this may in fact mean the restoration of a state of repose or equilibrium, and though we may even identify this equilibrium of 'release from tension' with a physical equilibrium—nevertheless, all this is merely a quite general proposition inadequate for the characterization of an instinct or its differentiation from other instincts. The gratification aimed at (even if it were in the physicist's view an increase in the entropy of the system) is in every instance a qualitatively determined situation, which has become historic and has certain conditioning factors which are extradynamic. From the point of view of dynamics there is no sense in considering it except in its *quantitative* aspect. The qualitative and historic factors must be considered from other points of view. They will of course be comprehended in the dynamic-economic purview also, in so far as they enter into the mechanical conditions of the system or the integrated subsystems. We must leave it to future investigators to examine whether in the case of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct these factors do so co-operate.

But we may venture to make a suggestion. In deriving pain from the mechanical conditions of the dual system we have become acquainted with a state in which the dynamic intensity is so distributed that it is necessary to eliminate and annihilate the sources of excitation (i.e. objects) in order to secure the minimum of potential. This probably corresponds to the psychic situation in which stimuli from the outside world are felt as disturbing factors which must be annihilated if they cannot be ignored—it corresponds, that is to say, to the instinct of destruction.

On various occasions and from various standpoints Freud has made a number of statements about the death instinct. If we were to summarize all that he has said about it under a single heading (because he uses the same term throughout) the result, from the standpoint of dynamics, would be a notion full of contradictions, for he alternates dynamic with economic considerations. The 'death instinct' is synonymous with the instinct of destruction, its partner is the sexual instinct and it is a dynamic concept in the theory of instinct; yet at the same time it is an *historic* concept, definitely comprising qualitative elements. It is to be found in the ego like the sexual instinct, with which it generally appears in combination, and, though it possibly

presents more problems for research than that instinct, these problems are of the same nature. Being ubiquitous, it has biological validity. Being, like the sexual instinct, on the boundary-line between psychic and physical concepts, it is a subject for physiological, but not for dynamic, examination.

The death instinct is something 'other' than the instinct of destruction only when we use the term to connote the biopsychic special case of the principle of stability; to physicists a more significant way of expressing this is to say: when the term 'death instinct' is used to denote the general tendency to entropy in all natural systems. We should be wise not to employ the term 'instinct' is describe this general behaviour of systems. For such a terminology obscures the problem of the function of the instincts (instinct of destruction and sexual instinct) in the general behaviour of the system, i.e. the equalization of difference of intensity.

If this exposition contain a germ of truth, then Freud's notion of the death instinct loses, it is true, the fine philosophical flavour which makes it at once so attractive and so controversial. For to the antithesis: instinct of destruction—sexual instinct, he opposes the antithesis: death instinct—Eros. In the physico-biological notion of the death instinct Eros has no place. The theory of energy has no cognizance of any partner, rival or opponent where the law of entropy is concerned, or at least of none other than the 'mechanical conditions' which in certain cases lengthen the way to entropy and enforce detours. Moreover, the combination of increasingly large masses of substance to form single entities is not in accordance with the trend of the physical process; on the contrary, this aims not merely at the dispersal of energy, but also at the dispersal of substance. From the point of view of physics the philosophically satisfying idea of 'forces opposed to death' has little meaning: from the standpoint of dynamic theory it has none at all. The death instinct, regarded as the behaviour of a system, has no partnership with Eros. Eros is not a mode of behaviour of systems in general; it belongs specifically to organic systems. Similarly, the tendency to destruction does not connote physical behaviour of systems in general: it, likewise, is specific for organic systems. These two modes of behaviour may, in the strictest sense of the word, aspire to the title of instinct—that which differentiates the behaviour of organic systems from the inorganic.

One might possibly have the impression that these ideas tend to a monism contradicting the dualism of instinct upon which Freud

insists. In particular, when we compare libido with free energy (potential of the individual) [4, p. 104] we may well be struck by a resemblance to the psycho-dynamic monism of Jung, his equation of libido and energy (primal libido). This is not the place in which to discuss Jung's theory. What he calls 'Energetik' (dynamics) [17], has little more than the word in common with the physicists' concept of energy. It is precisely when we wish to establish the dualism of

instinct that we lay special emphasis on the monistic character of energy and distinguish it from the multiplicity (dualism) of the instincts. Energy is the sum of the capacity for doing work. Hence it is the 'same' energy which operates as the libido and as the motive power of the instinct of destruction. The free energy of the system P, its potential, can be measured only by a 'monistic' computation. The potential is directed, moreover, to one end only, as is all dynamic movement in nature—namely, towards diminution. Certain specific organic conditions of the system compel organisms to follow this trend in two modes qualitatively so different, accompanied by such opposite phenomena and consciously felt to be so incommensurable. To revert to the language of psycho-analysis, I refer to the manifestations of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct.

We have tried to find out something about these specific conditions of the system. When the course of dynamic processes in a dual system, subject to the mechanical conditions of osmosis, is such that a single potential difference exists between the two parts of that system (central apparatus [brain plus nervous system] and cells [body]), the entropy-law impels it to a lowering of the potential. So long as the latter does not exceed a certain minimum, it may be lowered by cutting off from the system supplies of energy from the outside world. If, however, this minimum be exceeded the potential can be lowered only by the accession to the system of fresh quantities of energy. Hence our physicist's model can achieve its entropy in two opposite ways. These correspond respectively to narcissistic-destructive and to object-libidinal behaviour. It would be more accurate to say that, dynamically, these two modes of instinctual behaviour are identical with the two modes of behaviour in the model. So that, without for a moment abandoning our theory of the dualism of instinct, the single trend of the physical processes in the system is maintained. Indeed, this 'referring' of the two instincts to the single dynamic process which comprehends them both adds certainty to Freud's thesis that from the dynamic standpoint the two are essentially different.

The general behaviour of systems is associated with the principle of Le Chatelier [3]. This lays down that every system resists the influences of the outside world, its aim being 'self-preservation', and is a special formulation of the more comprehensive entropy principle. It applies to systems in stable equilibrium. System P cannot behave simply in accordance with Le Chatelier's principle, for it is only in special border-line states that it has a stable equilibrium (or at any rate for short periods of time, e.g. in sleep). In these states the system's behaviour does actually consist of nothing but the simplest activities of resistance or yielding—it is motivated by the 'instinct of repose' (the instinct of destruction). In general, however, its task is not merely to strike a balance of energy, which would soon lead to a stable condition in its relation to the outside world, but it has also to master the differences of energy arising within it and therefore it has need of the more complicated mechanism of the craving for stimulus, libidinal behaviour and the sexual instincts.

From the hypothesis of the dual system we draw the conclusion that the sexual instinct and the instinct of destruction alone can claim to rank as instincts: the specific behaviour of living systems (osmotic dual systems). The death instinct in the sense of the Nirvana principle represents the general behaviour of natural systems (the same applies to the so-called instinct of 'self-preservation' [3]) which, on the level of system P with its historical mechanical conditions, is secured only by the operation of the instinct of destruction and the sexual instinct.

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ENDOPSYCHIC STRUCTURE CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF OBJECT-RELATIONSHIPS

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OBJECT-RELATIONSHIP PSYCHOLOGY AS THE RATIONALE OF THE INTERNALIZATION OF OBJECTS

In a previous article (1941) I attempted to formulate a new version of the libido theory and to outline the general features which a systematic psychopathology based upon this re-formulation would appear to assume. The basic conception which I advanced on that occasion, and to which I still adhere, is to the effect that libido is primarily object-seeking (rather than pleasure-seeking, as in the classic theory), and that it is to disturbances in the object-relationships of the developing ego that we must look for the ultimate origin of all psychopathological conditions. This conception seems to me not only to be closer in accord with psychological facts and clinical data than that embodied in Freud's original theory of the libido, but also to represent a logical outcome of the present stage of psycho-analytical thought and a necessary step in the further development of psycho-analytical theory. In particular, it seems to me to constitute an inevitable implication of the illuminating conception of internalized objects, which has been so fruitfully developed by Melanie Klein, but which traces its scientific origin to Freud's theory of the super-ego (an endopsychic structure which was, of course, conceived by him as originating in the internalization of objects).

Quite apart from the considerations advanced in my previous paper or various other considerations which could be adduced, it may be claimed that the psychological introjection of objects and, in particular, the perpetuation of introjected objects in inner reality are processes which by their very nature imply that libido is essentially object-seeking; for the mere presence of oral impulses is in itself quite insufficient to account for such a pronounced devotion to objects as these phenomena imply. A similar implication would appear to arise out of the mere possibility of an Œdipus situation being perpetuated in the unconscious; for unceasing devotion to an object constitutes the very essence of this situation. Nevertheless the conception of internalized objects has been developed without any significant modification of a libido theory with which there is no small reason to think that it is incompatible. Freud himself never saw fit to undertake any systematic re-formulation of his original theory of libido, even after the introduction of his theory of the super-ego. At the same time there are innumerable passages in his works in which it appears to be taken for granted that libido is specifically object-seeking. Indeed it is possible to find passages in which this implicit view becomes explicit—as, for example, when he states quite simply (1929): 'Love seeks for objects.' This statement occurs in a paragraph in which, referring to his original theory of instincts, he writes as follows: 'Thus first arose the contrast between ego instincts and object instincts. For the energy of the latter instincts and exclusively for them I introduced the term libido; an antithesis was then formed between the ego instincts and the libidinal instincts directed towards objects.' As Freud proceeds to point out, the distinction between these two groups of instincts was abandoned upon his 'introduction of the concept of narcissism, i.e. the idea that libido cathects the ego itself'; but in the light of the passage quoted it would appear no very revolutionary step to claim that libido is primarily object-seeking, especially if, as I have suggested in my previous article, we conceive of narcissism as a state in which the ego is identified with objects.[1]

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[1]Quite apart from this suggestion, there is no necessary incompatibility between the view that libido is primarily object-seeking and the conception of libido cathecting the ego, since there is always the possibility of one part of the ego structure treating another part as an object—a possibility which cannot be ignored in the light of what follows regarding the splitting of the ego.

Nevertheless the ever increasing concentration of psycho-analytical research upon object-relationships has left unmodified the original theory that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking, and with it the related conception that 'the course of mental processes is automatically regulated by "the pleasure principle"' (Freud, 1920; 1). The persistence of this view has raised various problems which might otherwise have proved easier of solution. Prominent amongst these is the problem for which Freud set out to find a solution in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) itself, viz. how it comes about that neurotics cling to painful experiences so assiduously. It was the difficulty of accounting for this phenomenon in terms of the pleasure principle that led Freud to fall back upon the conception of a 'repetition compulsion'. If, however, libido is regarded as primarily object-seeking, there is no need to resort to this expedient; and in a recent article (1943) I attempted to show how the tendency to cling to painful experiences may be explained in terms of relationships with bad objects. In the same article I also attempted to show how the difficulties involved in the conception of primary 'death instincts' (in contrast to the conception of primary aggressive instincts) may be avoided if all the implications of libidinal relationships with bad objects are taken into account.

IMPULSE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS

In actual fact, the 'object-relationship' standpoint which I have now come to adopt has resulted from an attempt, imposed upon me by circumstances, to gain a better understanding of the problems presented by patients displaying certain schizoid tendencies, i.e. a class of individuals for whom object-relationships present an especial difficulty; and here, in parenthesis, I venture to express the opinion that psycho-analytical research in its later phases has suffered from too great a preoccupation with the problems of melancholia. Previous to my reaching the above mentioned standpoint, however, I had already become very much impressed by the limitations of 'impulse psychology' in general, and somewhat sceptical of the explanatory value of all theories of instinct in which the instincts are treated as existing *per se*. The limitations of impulse psychology make themselves felt in a very practical sense within the therapeutic field; for, whilst to reveal the nature of his 'impulses' to a patient by painstaking analysis is one proposition, to enable him to know what to do with these 'impulses' is quite another. What an individual shall do with his 'impulses' is clearly a problem of object-relationships. It is equally a problem of his own personality; but (constitutional factors apart) problems of the personality are themselves bound up with object-relationships. These problems are bound up with the relationships of the ego to its internalized objects—or, as I should prefer to say for reasons which will shortly appear, the relationships of various *parts* of the ego to internalized objects and to one another as objects. In a word 'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the endopsychic structures which they energize and the object-relationships which they enable these structures to establish; and, equally, 'instincts' cannot profitably be considered as anything more than forms of energy which constitute the dynamic of such endopsychic structures.

From a practical psychotherapeutic standpoint the analysis of impulses considered apart from structures proves itself a singularly sterile procedure, and particularly so in the case of patients with well-marked schizoid tendencies. By means of interpretations couched more or less exclusively in terms of impulses, it is sometimes quite easy in such cases to release a flood of associations (e.g. in the form of oral-sadistic phantasies), which appear singularly impressive as manifestations of the unconscious, but which can be maintained indefinitely without any real movement in the direction of integration and without any significant therapeutic development. The explanation of this phenomenon would appear to be that the ego (or, as I should prefer to say, *the central ego*) does not participate in the phantasies described except as a recording agent. When such a situation arises, the central ego, so to speak, sits back in the dress-circle and describes the dramas enacted upon the stage of inner reality without any effective participation in them. At the same time it derives considerable narcissistic satisfaction from being the recorder of remarkable events and identifying itself with the analyst as observer while asserting

a superiority over the analyst as mere observer by reason of the fact that it is not merely observing, but also furnishing the material for observation. This procedure is really a masterpiece of defensive technique—one to which schizoid individuals are only too ready to resort at the best of times, but which constitutes an almost irresistible temptation to them when the analyst's interpretations are couched too exclusively in terms of 'impulses'. Such a technique provides the best of all means of enabling the patient to evade the central therapeutic problem, viz. how to release those dynamic charges known as 'impulses' in the context of reality. This problem is clearly one of object-relationships within the social order.

My point regarding the inadequacy of impulse psychology may be illustrated by a reference to one of the cases in the light of which my present views were developed. This patient was an unmarried woman with schizoid features which were none the less present because the clinical picture was dominated by well-marked phobic and hysterical symptoms, as well as by generalized anxiety. She was repressed in proportion to a high degree of unrelieved libidinal tension. When this

libidinal tension rose during a session, it was no uncommon occurrence for her to complain of feeling sick. This sense of nausea was undoubtedly a transference phenomenon based upon an attitude towards her mother and her mother's breast mediated by her father and her father's penis, all as internalized objects; and it readily lent itself to interpretation in terms of oral impulses in so far as her associations had been characterized from the first by a considerable amount of oral material. Nevertheless the chief significance of her nausea seemed to reside, not so much in the oral nature of the reaction as in the influence shown by this reaction to be exercised upon her object-relationships (1) by a libidinal fixation upon her mother's breast, and (2) by an attitude of rejection towards the object of her libidinal need. It was true, of course, that the oral nature of her reaction was related to a severe repression of genital sexuality; and she was probably right when, on more than one occasion, she hazarded the opinion that she would be frigid in intercourse, although the correctness of this surmise had never been put to the test. At the same time, her difficulty in achieving a genital attitude seemed best understood, not in terms of any fixation at an oral stage, but rather in terms of a rejection of her father's penis based partly on an identification of this object with the bad breast, partly on a preferential fixation on the breast, and partly on the emotional 'badness' of her father as a whole object. The scales were further weighted against a genital attitude by the fact that an oral attitude involves a lesser degree of commitment to the object whilst conferring a greater measure of power over it. It was not uncommon for the same patient to say during a session: 'I want to go the lavatory.' In the first instance this statement had quite a literal significance; but later in the analysis it came increasingly to mean that she was experiencing a desire to express libidinal feelings mobilized by the transference situation. Here again, it was not in the nature of the 'impulse' considered in terms of phases (this time urinary and anal) that the chief significance of the phenomenon lay. It lay rather in the quality of the object-relationship involved. 'Going to the lavatory', like 'being sick', undoubtedly signified a rejection of the libidinal object considered as contents. Nevertheless, as compared with 'being sick', it signified a lesser measure of rejection; for, although in both cases a cathartic discharge of libidinal tension was also involved, the discharge of contents represented by 'going to the lavatory', being a discharge of assimilated contents, indicated a greater willingness to express libidinal feelings *before* an external object, albeit falling short of that direct discharge of feelings *towards* an object, which characterizes the genital attitude.

The scientific validity of a psychological theory cannot, of course, be assessed solely in terms of psychotherapeutic success or failure; for the scientific significance of therapeutic results can only be judged when it is known exactly how these results are obtained. Impulse psychology cannot be regarded as providing any exception to this general rule; but it is significant that, where psycho-analysis is concerned, it is now generally recognized that therapeutic results are closely related to the phenomenon of transference, i.e. to the establishment of an object-relationship of a special kind with the analyst on the part of the patient. On the other hand, it is

an accepted article of the psycho-analytical technique that the analyst should be unusually self-effacing. As we know, there are very good reasons for the adoption of such an attitude on his part; but it inevitably has the effect of rendering the object-relationship between patient and analyst somewhat one-sided from the patient's point of view and thus contributing to the resistance. A certain one-sidedness in the relationship between patient and analyst is, of course, inherent in the analytical situation; but it would appear that, when the self-effacing attitude of the analyst is combined with a mode of interpretation based upon a psychology of impulse, a considerable strain is imposed upon the patient's capacity for establishing satisfactory object-relationships (a capacity which must be regarded as already compromised in virtue of the fact that the patient is a patient at all). At the same time, the patient is placed under a considerable temptation to adopt, among other defences, that to which reference has already been made, viz. the technique of describing scenes enacted on the stage of inner reality without any significant participation on the part of the central ego either in these scenes or in an effective object-relationship with the analyst. One of my patients, who was a past master in this technique, said to me one day, after providing a comprehensive intellecutual description of the state of impulse-tension in which he felt himself to be placed: 'Well, what are you going to do about it?' By way of reply I explained that the real question was what he himself was going to do about it. This reply proved highly disconcerting to him, as indeed it was intended to be. It was disconcerting to him because it faced him abruptly with the real problem of the analysis and of his life. How an individual is going to dispose of impulse-tension is clearly a problem of object-relationships: but it is equally a problem of the personality, since an object-relationship necessarily involves a subject as well as an object. The theory of object-relationships thus inevitably leads us to the position that, if impulses cannot be considered apart from objects, whether external or internal, it is equally impossible to consider them apart from ego structures. Indeed it is even more impossible to consider impulses apart from ego structures, since it is only ego structures that can seek relationships with objects. We are thus

brought back to the conclusion, already recorded, that 'impulses' are but the dynamic aspect of endopsychic structures and cannot be said to exist in the absence of such structures, however immature these may turn out to be. Ultimately 'impulses' must be simply regarded as constituting the forms of activity in which the life of ego structures consists.

STRUCTURE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE REPRESSION OF STRUCTURES

Once the position now indicated has been reached, it obviously becomes incumbent upon us to review afresh our theory of the mental apparatus. In particular, it becomes a question how far Freud's description of mental structure in terms of id, ego and super-ego can be retained without modification. The moment this question is raised, it is, of course, plainly in relation to the status of the id that doubts will first arise; for, if it be true that no 'impulses' can be regarded as existing in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer be possible to preserve any psychological distinction between the id and the ego. Freud's conception of the *origin* of the ego as a structure which develops on the surface of the psyche for the purpose of regulating id-impulses in relation to reality will thus give place to a conception of the ego as the source of impulse-tension from the beginning. This inclusion of the id in the ego will, of course, leave essentially unaffected Freud's conception of the *function* served by the 'ego' in regulating the discharge of impulse-tension in deference to the conditions of outer reality. It will, however, involve the view that 'impulses' are oriented towards reality, and thus to some extent determined by the 'reality principle', from the very beginning. Thus, for example, the child's earliest oral behaviour will be regarded as oriented *ab initio* towards the breast. In accordance with this point of view, the pleasure principle will cease to be regarded as the primary principle of behaviour and will come to be regarded as a subsidiary principle of behaviour involving an impoverishment of object-relationships and coming into operation in proportion as the reality principle fails to operate, whether this be on account of the immaturity of the ego structure or on account of a failure of development on its part. Questions regarding the extent to which the reality principle has superseded the pleasure principle will then give place to questions

regarding the extent to which an originally immature reality principle has progressed towards maturity; and questions regarding the capacity of the ego to regulate id-impulses in deference to reality will give place to questions regarding the measure in which the ego structure within which impulse-tension arises has been organized in accordance with the reality principle, or, in default of this, has resorted to the pleasure principle as a means of organization.

If, then, 'impulse' is to be regarded as inseparably associated with an ego structure from the beginning, what becomes of Freud's conception of repression as a function exercised by the ego in its dealings with impulses originating in the id? I have already elsewhere (1943) considered the implications of my theory of object-relationships for the concept of repression. There I advanced the view that repression is primarily exercised, not against impulses which have come to appear painful or 'bad' (as in Freud's final view) or even against painful memories (as in Freud's earlier view), but against *internalized objects* which have come to be treated as bad. I still feel justified in regarding this view as correct; but in certain other respects my views regarding repression have undergone a change. In particular, I have come to regard repression as exercised, not only against internalized objects (which, incidentally, must be regarded as endopsychic structures, albeit not ego structures), but also against parts of the 'ego' which seek relationships with these internal objects. Here it may occur to the reader to pass the criticism that, since repression is a function of the 'ego', this view involves the anomaly of the ego repressing itself. How, it may be asked, can the ego be conceived as repressing the ego? The answer to this question is that, whilst it is inconceivable that the ego as a whole should repress itself, it is not inconceivable that one part of the 'ego' with a dynamic charge should repress another part of the 'ego' with a dynamic charge. This is, of course, quite a different proposition from one set of impulses repressing another set—a conception rightly rejected by Freud when engaged in the task of formulating his theory of the mental apparatus. In order to account for repression Freud found himself compelled to postulate the existence of a *structure* capable of instigating repression—viz. the super-ego. It is, therefore, only another step in the same direction to postulate the existence of structures which are repressed. Apart from any theoretical reasons such as those already advanced, there are very good clinical reasons for making such an assumption. Prominent among these is the difficulty experienced in effecting the sublimation of libidinal 'impulses'. This difficulty cannot be adequately explained as due to an inveterate and inherent obstinacy on the part of 'impulses' themselves, especially once we have come to regard 'impulses' as just forms of energy at the disposal of the ego structure. On the contrary, it can only be satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the repressed 'impulses' are inseparable from an ego structure with a definite pattern. The correctness of this assumption is confirmed by the phenomena of multiple personality, in which the linkage of repressed 'impulses' with a submerged ego structure is beyond question; but such a linkage may also be detected in the less extensive

forms of dissociation, which are so characteristic of the hysterical individual. In order to account for repression, we thus appear to be driven to the necessity of assuming a certain multiplicity of egos. This should not really prove a particularly difficult conception for any one familiar with the problems presented by schizoid patients. But here, as so often, we are reminded of the limitations imposed upon psycho-analytical theory in some of its later developments by a preoccupation with the phenomena of melancholia.

THE SCHIZOID POSITION

That Freud's theory of mental structure is itself based in no small measure upon a consideration of the phenomena of melancholia can hardly escape the notice of any reader *of The Ego and the Id* (1923), the work which contains the classic exposition of the theory; and, in conformity with this fact, it is in his paper entitled 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917) that we find the final link in the chain of thought which culminated in the exposition in question. Correspondingly the 'depressive position' is accorded a place of central importance in the views of Melanie Klein and

her collaborators. Here I must confess that the accordance of such a central place to the depressive position is difficult to reconcile with my own experience. It would be idle, of course, to deny the importance of the depressive position in individuals suffering from true depression or, for that matter, in individuals of a depressive type. So far as my experience goes, however, such individuals do not constitute any appreciable proportion of the analyst's clientèle, although, of course, they are common enough in ordinary psychiatric practice. So far as concerns the usual run of patients suffering from anxiety states, psychoneurotic symptoms and character difficulties, the central position seems to me to be schizoid rather than depressive in the vast majority of those who embark upon and persist in analytical treatment; and it is not very often that I find a patient under analysis displaying what I should regard as an incontrovertibly depressive (i.e. melancholic) reaction. By contrast I find schizoid reactions relatively common.

At this point I feel it necessary to refer to the distinction which I have already drawn (1941) between the characteristically melancholic affect of 'depression' and the 'sense of futility' which I have come to regard as the characteristically schizoid affect. From the point of view of the observer there is, admittedly, sufficient superficial similarity between the two affects to render the distinction difficult to draw in many cases, especially since the schizoid individual so commonly describes himself as 'depressed'; and consequently the familiar term 'depressed' is frequently applied in clinical practice to patients who should properly be described as suffering from a sense of futility. In this way a confusion of classification is liable to occur, with the result that a number of patients with psychoneurotic symptoms come to be regarded as belonging to the depressive type when the type to which they belong is really schizoid. Apart from this source of confusion, however, it is a common thing for a basic schizoid position to escape notice in the case of 'psychoneurotic' patients owing to the strength of psychoneurotic defences and the resulting prominence of psychoneurotic (e.g. hysterical) symptoms in the clinical picture. Yet, when we consider the cases cited by Janet in illustration of the material upon the basis of which he formulated the conception of hysteria as a clinical entity, it is difficult to avoid concluding that quite a number of the individuals concerned displayed remarkably schizoid characteristics; and indeed it may be surmised that an appreciable proportion would actually be diagnosed as frank schizophrenics if they appeared in a modern psychiatric clinic. Here it may be added that my own investigations of patients with hysterical symptoms leave me in no doubt whatever that the dissociation phenomena of 'hysteria' involve a split of the ego fundamentally identical with that which confers upon the term 'schizoid' its etymological significance.

'BACK TO HYSTERIA'

At this point it seems apposite to recall that Freud's earliest researches within the realm of psychopathology were concerned almost exclusively with hysterical (and *not* with melancholic) phenomena, and that it is upon a basis of these phenomena, accordingly, that psycho-analytical theory and practice were originally founded. It would doubtless be idle to speculate to what extent the development of psycho-analytical theory would have pursued a different course if hysterical phenomena had retained the central place which they originally occupied in Freud's researches; but it may at least be surmised that the importance subsequently assumed by the depressive position would have been assumed in large measure by the schizoid position. It was, of course, when Freud turned from the study of the repressed to a study of the agency of repression that the problems of melancholia began to oust problems of hysteria from the central position which the latter had hitherto occupied. That this should have been the case is not difficult to understand in view of (a) the close association which appears to exist between guilt and repression, on the one hand, and (b) the outstanding prominence which guilt assumes in the melancholic state, on the other. Be that as it may, Freud's theory of the super-ego certainly represents an attempt to trace the genesis of guilt and the instigation of repression to a common source in the Œdipus situation. This fact gives rise to a serious incompatibility between Freud's views regarding the origin of repression and Abraham's 'phase'

[2]I should add that, in my opinion, it is always 'bad' objects that are internalized in the first instance, since it is difficult to find any adequate motive for the internalization of objects which are satisfying and 'good'. Thus it would be a pointless procedure on the part of the infant to internalize the breast of a mother with whom he already had a perfect relationship in the absence of such internalization, and whose milk proved sufficient to satify his incorporative needs. According to this line of thought it is only in so far as his mother's breast fails to satisfy his physical and emotional needs and thus becomes a bad object that it becomes necessary for the infant to internalize it. It is only later that good objects are internalized to defend the child's ego against bad objects which have been internalized already; and the super-ego is a 'good object' of this nature.

theory of libidinal development; for, whilst Freud conceived the Œdipus situation, to which he looked for the rationale of repression, as essentially a genital situation, his account of the origin of the super-ego, which he regarded as the instigator of repression, is conceived in terms of an oral situation, i.e. a situation corresponding to a stage which, according to the 'phase' theory, must necessarily be pregenital. Melanie Klein has, of course, come to regard the Œdipus situation as originating at a very much earlier stage than was formerly supposed. Her resolution of the difficulty must accordingly be interpreted as having been achieved at the expense of the 'phase' theory. This theory has already been the subject of detailed criticism on my part (1941). At the same time I have now come to look for the source of repression not only beyond the genital attitude, but also beyond the Œdipus situation, and even beyond the level at which the super-ego is established. Thus I not only attempted elsewhere (1943) to show that repression originates primarily as a defence against 'bad' internalized objects (and not against impulses, whether incestuous in the genital sense or otherwise), but also that *guilt* originates as an *additional* defence against situations involving bad internalized objects. According to this view, guilt originates on the principle that the child finds it more tolerable to regard himself as conditionally (i.e. morally) bad than to regard his parents as unconditionally (i.e. libidinally) bad. To describe the process whereby the change from the latter to the former attitude is effected, I introduced the term 'moral defence'; and, according to my view, it is only at the instance of the 'moral defence' that the super-ego is established.[2] The establishment of the super-ego accordingly represents the attainment of a new level of structural organization, beneath which the old level persists. Thus, in my opinion, beneath the level at which the central ego finds itself confronted with the super-ego as an internal object of moral significance lies a level at which parts of the ego find themselves confronted with internal objects which are, not simply devoid of moral significance, but unconditionally bad from a libidinal standpoint (amoral internal persecutors of one kind or another). Whilst, therefore, the main phenomenon of melancholia may be regarded as receiving a relatively satisfactory explanation at the super-ego level, some of the accompanying phenomena are not so easily explained. Thus the paranoid and hypochondriacal trends which so frequently manifest themselves in melancholics represent an orientation towards internal objects which are in no sense 'good', but are unconditionally (i.e. libidinally) bad. The same may be said of the obsessional features which are so characteristic of individuals in the intial stages of depression; for the obsessional defence is not primarily moral. On the contrary, this defence is essentially a defence against the 'unlucky', i.e. against situations involving relationships with unconditionally bad (internal) objects. It is equally difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of the symptoms of 'hysteria' at the super-ego level—if for no other reason than that in 'hysteria' the libidinal inhibitions which occur are out of all proportion to the measure of guilt which is found to be present. Since, therefore, it was in an effort on Freud's part to explain hysterical phenomena that psycho-analysis originated, it may not be without profit to return to a consideration of this material, encouraging ourselves, if encouragement be needed, with the slogan 'Back to hysteria'.

A MULTIPLICITY OF EGOS

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that, whereas the repressed was eventually described by Freud as consisting essentially of impulses, he found it necessary to fall back upon structural conceptions (the ego and the super-ego) when he came to seek an explanation of the agency of repression. Reduced to its simplest terms, Freud's conception of repression is to the following effect:—(a) that the agency of repression is the ego, (b) that repression is instigated and maintained by the pressure of the super-ego (an internalized parental figure) upon the ego, (c) that the repressed consists essentially in libidinal impulses, and (d) that repression arises as a means of defence against impulses involved in the Œdipus situation and treated by the ego as 'guilty' in terms of the pressure of the super-ego. That the agent and the instigator of repression should both be regarded as structures whilst the repressed is regarded as consisting of impulses involves a certain anomaly which appears so far to have escaped attention. The extent of this anomaly may perhaps best be appreciated in the light of the fact that the super-ego, which is described as the instigator of repression, is itself largely unconscious; for this raises the difficult question whether the super-ego itself is not also repressed. Freud himself was by no means oblivious to this problem; and he expressly envisages the possibility of the super-ego being in some measure subject to repression. Repression of the super-ego would, of course, represent the repression of a structure. It would thus appear

that the general possibility of the repression of a structure is recognized by Freud; and, in the light of the considerations already advanced, it becomes reasonable to ask whether the repressed is not invariably and inherently structural. In this event the anomaly to which I have referred would be avoided.

That the repressed is essentially structural in nature is implicit in the view which I have already advanced (1943) to the effect that repression is primarily directed against internalized objects which are treated as bad; for, unless it is assumed that internalized objects are structures, the conception of the existence of such objects becomes utterly meaningless. In the light of further experience, my view that repression is primarily directed against bad internalized objects has proved to require considerable elaboration in a direction which has eventually led me to a revised conception of psychical structure. What actually provided the occasion of my chief step in this direction was the analysis of a dream recorded by one of my patients. This patient was a married woman who originally came to me for analysis on account of frigidity. Her frigidity was unquestionably a phenomenon of hysterical dissociation (hysterical anæsthesia combined with hysterical paresis of the vagina); but, like all such phenomena, it represented but one part of a general personality problem. The dream itself was simple enough; but it struck me in the light of one of those simple manifestations which have so often in the history of science been found to embody fundamental truths.

The (manifest) dream to which I refer consisted in a brief scene in which the dreamer saw the figure of herself being viciously attacked by a well-known actress in a venerable building which had belonged to her family for generations. Her husband was looking on; but he seemed quite helpless and quite incapable of protecting her. After delivering the attack the actress turned away and resumed playing a stage part, which, as seemed to be implied, she had momentarily set aside in order to deliver the attack by way of interlude. The dreamer then found herself gazing at the figure of herself lying bleeding on the floor; but, as she gazed, she noticed that this figure turned for an instant into that of a man. Thereafter the figure alternated between herself and this man until eventually she awoke in a state of acute anxiety.

It came as no great surprise to me to learn from the dreamer's associations that the man into whom the figure of herself turned was wearing a suit closely resembling one which her husband had recently acquired, and that, whilst he had acquired this suit at her instigation, he had taken 'one of his blondes' to the fitting. This fact, taken in conjunction with the fact that in the dream he was a helpless spectator of the attack, at once confirmed a natural suspicion that the attack was directed no less against him than against herself. This suspicion was amply confirmed by further associations which need not be detailed. The course followed by the associations also

confirmed an additional suspicion that the actress who delivered the attack belonged as much to the personality of the dreamer as did the figure of herself against which the attack was delivered. In actual fact, the figure of an actress was well suited to represent a certain aspect of herself; for she was essentially a shut-in and withdrawn personality who displayed very little genuine feeling towards others, but who had perfected the technique of presenting façades to a point at which these assumed a remarkably genuine appearance and achieved for her a remarkable popularity. Such libidinal affect as she experienced had, since childhood, manifested itself predominantly in a secret phantasy life of masochistic complexion; but in the life of outer reality she had largely devoted herself to the playing of rôles—e.g. the rôles of good wife, good mother, good hostess and good business woman. From this fact the helplessness attributed to her husband in the dream derived additional significance; for, although she played the rôle of good wife with conspicuous success, her real personality was quite inaccessible to him and the good wife whom he knew was for the most part only the good actress. This held true not only within the sphere of emotional relationships, but also within the sphere of marital relations; for, whilst she remained frigid during intercourse, she had acquired the capacity of conveying the impression of sexual excitement and sexual satisfaction. Further, as the analysis revealed beyond all question, her frigidity represented not only an attack upon the libidinal component in herself, but also a hostile attitude towards her husband as a libidinal object. It is clear, therefore, that a measure of hidden aggression against her husband was involved in her assumption of the rôle of actress as this was portrayed in the dream. It is equally clear from the dream that, in a libidinal capacity, she was identified with her husband as the object of her own aggression. At this point, it should be mentioned that, when the dream occurred, her husband was a member of one of the combatant Services and was about to return home on leave. On the eve of his return, and just before the occurrence of the dream, she had developed a sore throat. This was a conjunction of events which had occurred so frequently in the past as to preclude coincidence on this occasion, and which accordingly served to confirm her identification with her husband as the object of her aggression. The situation represented in the dream is thus one in which the dreamer in one capacity, so far unspecified, vents her aggression directly against herself in another capacity, viz., a libidinal capacity, whilst, at the same time,

venting her aggression indirectly against her husband as a libidinal object. At a superficial level, of course, this situation readily lent itself to being interpreted in the sense that the dreamer, being ambivalent towards her husband, had diverted the aggressive component in her ambivalent attitude from her husband to herself at the instance of guilt over her aggression in conformity with the melancholic pattern. Nevertheless, during the actual session in which the dream was recorded this interpretation did not commend itself to me as exhaustive, even at a superficial level.

It is obvious, of course, that the situation represented in the dream lent itself to a deeper interpretation than that to which reference has just been made. The situation was described a moment ago as one in which the dreamer in a capacity so far unspecified vented her aggression directly against herself in a libidinal capacity, whilst, at the same time, venting her aggression indirectly against her husband as a libidinal object. This description is, of course, incomplete in that it leaves unspecified the capacity in which she expressed her aggression; and it is when we come to consider the nature of this unspecified capacity that the deeper significance of the dream becomes a matter of moment. According to the manifest content of the dream, it was as an actress that she delivered the attack; and we have already seen how well suited the figure of an actress was to represent an aspect of herself hostile to libidinal relationships. However, abundant material had already emerged during the analysis to make it plain that the figure of an actress was at least equally well suited to represent the dreamer's mother—an artificial woman who had neither displayed any natural and spontaneous affection towards her children nor welcomed any such display on their part towards herself, and for whom the fashionable world provided a stage upon which she had spent her life in playing parts. It was thus easy to see that,

in the capacity of actress, the dreamer was closely identified with her mother as a repressive figure. The introduction of her mother into the drama as an apparently 'super-ego' figure at once raises the question whether the deeper interpretation of the dream should not be couched in terms of the Œdipus situation; and it becomes natural to ask whether her father is not also represented. In reality her father had been killed on active service during the war of 1914–18, at a time when she was only six years of age; and analysis had revealed the presence of considerable resentment towards him as a libidinal object who had proved at once exciting and rejecting (this resentment being focussed particularly upon the memory of an early dressing-room scene). If then we are to look for a representation of her father in the dream, our choice is obviously limited to a single figure—the man who alternated with the figure of the dreamer as the object of attack. We have seen, of course, that this figure represented her husband; but analysis had already revealed how closely her husband was identified by transference with her father. For this, as well as for other reasons which need not be detailed, it was safe to infer that the man who was involved in the attack represented her father at the deeper level of interpretation. At this level, accordingly, the dream was capable of being interpreted as a phantasy in which both she and her father were portrayed as being killed by her mother on account of a guilty incestuous relationship. At the same time the dream was equally capable of being interpreted in terms of psychical structure, and thus as representing the repression of her libido on account of its incestuous attachment to her father at the instigation of a super-ego modelled upon her mother. Nevertheless, neither of these interpretations seemed to me to do justice to the material, although the structural interpretation seemed to offer the more fruitful line of approach.

At this point I feel it necessary to make some reference to the development of my own views regarding phantasy in general and dreams in particular. Many years ago I had the opportunity to analyse a most unusual woman whom, in retrospect, I now recognize to have been a schizoid personality, and who was a most prolific dreamer. Among the dreams recorded by this woman were a number which defied all efforts to bring them into conformity with the 'wish-fulfilment' theory, and which she herself came to describe quite spontaneously as 'state of affairs' dreams, intending by this description to imply that they represented actually existing endopsychic situations. Doubtless this made an impression on me. At any rate, much later, after Freud's theory of psychical structure had become familiar, after Melanie Klein had elaborated the conceptions of psychical reality and internal objects and after I myself had become impressed by the prevalence and importance of schizoid phenomena, I tentatively formulated the view that all the figures appearing in dreams represented either parts of the dreamer's own personality (conceived in terms of ego, super-ego and id) or else identifications on the part of the ego. A further development of this view was to the effect that dreams are essentially, not wish-fulfilments, but snapshots, or rather 'shorts' (in the cinematographic sense), of situations existing in inner reality. To the view that dreams are essentially 'shorts' of situations existing in inner reality I still adhere in conformity with the general line of thought pursued in this article; but, so far as the figures appearing in dreams are concerned, I have now modified my view to the effect that such figures represent either parts of the 'ego' or internalized objects. According to my present view, therefore, the situations depicted in dreams represent relationships existing between endopsychic structures; and the same

applies to situations depicted in waking phantasies. This conclusion is the natural outcome of my theory of object-relationships taken in conjunction with a realization of the inescapable fact that internalized objects must be regarded as endopsychic structures if any theoretic significance whatever is to be attached to them.

After this explanatory digression I must return to the specific dream under discussion with a view to giving some account of the conclusions which I subsequently reached, in no small measure as the result of an attempt to solve the theoretic problems which it raised in my mind. As I have already stated, none of the obvious interpretations seemed to me entirely satisfactory, although the structural type of interpretation seemed to offer the most fruitful line of approach.

The reader will, of course, bear in mind what I have already said regarding psychical structures; and he will also recall my having already formulated the view that all psychopathological developments originate at a stage antecedent to that at which the super-ego develops and proceed from a level beneath that at which the super-ego operates. Thus no reference will be made in what follows either to the super-ego or to the id as explanatory concepts. On the contrary, whilst adopting a structural approach, I shall attempt to elucidate the significance of the dream quite simply in terms of the data which it itself provides.

In the manifest dream the actual drama involves four figures:—(1) the figure of the dreamer subjected to attack, (2) the man into whom this figure turns, and who then alternates with it, (3) the attacking actress, and (4) the dreamer's husband as a helpless onlooker. In our preoccupation with the actual drama, however, we must not forget our only witness of its occurrence—the dreamer herself, the observing ego. Including her, there are five figures to be reckoned with. At this juncture I venture to suggest that, if the dream had ended a few seconds earlier, there would only have been four figures, even on the assumption that the 'I' of the dream is taken into account; for it was only in the fifth act, so to speak, that a man began to alternate with the figure of the dreamer as the object of attack. This is an interesting reflection; for we must conclude that, up to the point of the emergence of this man, the object of attack was a composite figure. The special interest of this phenomenon resides in the fact that, as we have seen, there is good reason to regard a second figure as composite; for the attacking actress undoubtedly represented both another figure of the dreamer and the dreamer's mother. I venture, therefore, to hazard a further suggestion—that, if the dream had lasted a few seconds longer, there might well have been six figures, instead of five. It is safe, at any rate, to infer that there were six figures in the latent content; and this, after all, is what matters for purposes of interpretation. Assuming then that six figures are represented in the dream, let us proceed to consider the nature of these figures. When we do so, our first observation is that the figures fall into two classes—ego structures and object structures. Interestingly enough there are three members of each class. The ego structures are (1) the observing ego or 'I', (2) the attacked ego, and (3) the attacking ego. The object structures are (1) the dreamer's husband as an observing object, (2) the attacked object, and (3) the attacking object. This leads us to make a second observation—that the ego structures naturally lend themselves to be paired off with the object structures. There are three such pairs:—(1) the observing ego and the dreamer's husband, who also figured as an observer; (2) the attacking ego and the attacking object representing her mother, and (3) the attacked ego and the attacked object representing her father (for at this point it is to the deeper level of interpretation that we must adhere).

Bearing these two main observations in mind, let us now consider the conclusions to which I was led in an attempt to interpret the dream to my satisfaction. They are as follows. The three ego figures which appear as separate in the dream actually represent separate ego structures in the dreamer's mind. The dreamer's 'ego' is therefore split in conformity with the schizoid position; and it is split into three separate egos—a central ego and two other subsidiary egos which are both, relatively speaking, cut off from the central ego. Of these two subsidiary egos, one is the object of aggression on the part of the other. Since the ego which is attacked is closely related to the dreamer's father (and by transference to her husband), it is safe to infer that this ego is highly endowed with libido; and it may thus be appropriately described as a 'libidinal ego'. Since the attacking ego is closely related to the dreamer's mother as a repressive figure, its behaviour is quite in accord with that traditionally ascribed to the super-ego in the setting of the Œdipus situation. Since, however, the attack bears all the marks of being vindictive, rather than moral, and gives rise to an affect, not of guilt, but of plain anxiety, there is no justification (apart from preconceptions) for equating the attacking ego with the super-ego. In any case, as I have already indicated, there is reason to attach overriding psychopathological importance to a level beneath that at which the super-ego functions. At the same time, it was shown by the circumstances in which the dream occurred that the dreamer's libidinal relationship with her husband was severely compromised; and, so far as the dream is concerned, it is clearly to the operation of the attacking ego that we must look for the compromising factor. Consequently, the attacking ego may perhaps be most appropriately described as an 'internal saboteur'. In an

attempt to discover what this dream was stating and to determine the structural significance of what was stated, I was accordingly led to set aside the traditional classification of mental structure in terms of ego, id and super-ego in favour of a classification couched in terms of an ego-structure split into three separate egos—(1) a central ego (the 'I'), (2) a libidinal ego, and (3) an aggressive, persecutory ego which I designate as the internal saboteur. Subsequent experience has led me to regard this classification as having a universal application.

THE OBJECT-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE CENTRAL EGO AND THE SUBSIDIARY EGOS

Such being my conclusions regarding the ego structures represented in the dream, let us now pass on to consider my conclusions regarding the object-relationships of these ego structures. As already indicated, each of the three egos in question naturally lends itself to being paired off with a special object. The special object of the central ego was the dreamer's husband; and it is convenient to begin by considering the nature of the attitude adopted by the dreamer's central ego towards him. Since the central ego was the observing 'I' of the dream, who was felt to be continuous with the waking 'I' by whom the dream was subsequently described, it is safe to infer that this ego is in no small measure preconscious—which is, in any case, what one would naturally expect of an ego deserving the title of 'central'. This inference gains further support from the fact that the dreamer's husband was a supremely important object in outer reality and was very much in the dreamer's conscious thoughts on the eve of the dream. Although the figure representing him in the dream must be regarded as an internalized object, this object must obviously occupy a much more superficial position in the psyche than the other objects represented (parental objects internalized in childhood); and it must correspond comparatively closely to the relative object in outer reality. Accordingly, the dreamer's attitude to her husband as an external object assumes considerable significance for our present purpose. This attitude was essentially ambivalent, especially where marital relations were concerned. Active manifestations of aggression towards him were, however, conspicuously absent. Equally, her libidinal attachment to him bore the marks of severe repression; and, in associating to the dream, she reproached herself over her lack of deep feeling towards him and her failure to give to him of herself, albeit her conscious capacity to remedy these deficiencies was restricted to an assumption of the rôle of 'good wife'. The question therefore arises whether, since her hidden aggression towards him and her hidden libidinal need of him do not declare themselves directly in the dream, they may not manifest themselves in some indirect fashion. No sooner is this question raised than we are at once reminded of the metamorphosis undergone by the figure of the libidinal ego after this was attacked by the figure of the internal saboteur. The libidinal ego changed into, and then began alternating with, a man who, whilst representing the dreamer's father at a deep level, was nevertheless closely associated with her husband. It is thus evident that, instead of being directed against her husband as an external object, a considerable proportion of her aggression was absorbed in an attack directed, not simply against the libidinal ego, but also against an internal object closely connected with the libidinal ego. It is likewise evident that this volume of aggression had come to be at the disposal, not of the central ego, but of the internal saboteur. What then of the libidinal component in her ambivalence? As we have seen, her libidinal attitude to her husband showed signs of considerable impoverishment in spite of good intentions at a conscious level. It is obvious, accordingly, that what held true of her aggression also held true of her libido. A considerable proportion had ceased to be at the disposal of the central ego. The object towards whom this volume of libido is directed can hardly remain in doubt. In terms of the dream, it must surely be the man who alternated with the libidinal self as the object of aggression. Unlike the aggression, however, this libido is not at the disposal of the internal saboteur. On the contrary we must regard it as being at the disposal of the libidinal ego; and indeed it is precisely for this reason that the term 'libidinal ego' has come to commend itself to me for adoption. At this point it becomes desirable to formulate a suspicion which must be already present in the mind of the reader—that, although it is represented otherwise in the dream, the attack delivered by the internal saboteur is only secondarily directed against the libidinal ego and is primarily directed against the libidinal

object which alternates with this ego. Assuming this suspicion to be correct, we must regard the ordeal to which the libidinal ego is subjected as evidence of a very complete identification with, and therefore a very strong libidinal attachment to, the attacked object on the part of the libidinal ego. It is evidence of the measure of 'suffering' which the libidinal ego is prepared to endure out of devotion to its object. The anxiety experienced by the dreamer on waking may be interpreted in a similar sense; and indeed I venture to suggest that this anxiety represented an irruption into consciousness of such 'suffering' on the part of the libidinal ego. Here we are at once reminded of Freud's original conception of neurotic anxiety as libido converted into suffering. This is a view which at one time presented the greatest theoretic difficulty to me, but which I have now come to appreciate in the light of my present standpoint, and substantially to accept in preference to the

modified view which Freud later (and, as I think, rather reluctantly) came to adopt.

The position regarding the object-relationships of the three egos represented in the dream has now been to some extent clarified; but the process of clarification is not yet complete. Up to date, the position which has emerged would appear to be as follows. The dreamer's preconscious attitude towards her husband is ambivalent; and this is the attitude adopted by her central ego towards its external object, as well as towards the internalized representative of this object. However, both the libidinal and the aggressive components in the object-relationship of the central ego are predominantly passive. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the dreamer's active libido is at the disposal of the libidinal self and is directed towards an internalized object which, for purposes of nomenclature, may perhaps best be described as 'the (internal) needed object'. At the same time, a considerable proportion of her aggression is at the disposal of the internal saboteur and is directed (a) towards the libidinal self, and (b) towards the needed object (i.e. towards the object of the libidinal self). It cannot fail to be noticed, however, that this summary of the position leaves out of account certain endopsychic relationships which may be presumed to exist—notably (1) the relationship of the central ego to the other egos, and (2) the relationship of the internal saboteur to the internalized object with which it is so closely associated, and which is represented by the maternal component in the actress figure. Taking the latter relationship first, we have no difficulty in seeing that, since the actress in the dream was a composite figure representing both the dreamer's mother and herself, the internal saboteur is closely identified with its object and must therefore be regarded as bound to this object by a strong libidinal attachment. For purposes of description we must give the object a name; and I propose to describe it as 'the (internal) rejecting object'. I have chosen this term primarily for a reason which will emerge later; but meanwhile my justification will be that the dreamer's mother, who provided the original model of this internalized object, was essentially a rejecting figure, and that it is, so to speak, in the name of this object that the aggression of the internal saboteur is directed against the libidinal self. As regards the relationship of the central ego to the other egos, our most important clue to its nature lies in the fact that, whereas the central ego must be regarded as comprising preconscious and conscious, as well as unconscious, elements, the other egos must equally be regarded as essentially unconscious. From this we may infer that the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur are both rejected by the central ego; and this inference is confirmed by the fact that, as we have seen, the considerable volume of libido and of aggression which has ceased to be at the disposal of the central ego is now at the disposal of the subsidiary egos. Assuming then that the subsidiary egos are rejected by the central ego, it becomes a question of the dynamic of this rejection. Obviously the dynamic of rejection cannot be libido. So there is no alternative but to regard it as aggression. Aggression must, accordingly, be regarded as the characteristic determinant of the attitude of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos.

I have now completed the account of my attempt to reconstruct, in terms of dynamic structure, the endopsychic situation represented in a patient's dream. The account has been cast in the form of a reasoned statement; and, as such, it should serve to give some indication of what is involved in my view that dreams are essentially 'shorts' of inner reality (rather than wish-

fulfilments). However, it is not primarily with the aim of substantiating my views on dreams in general that I have claimed so much of the reader's attention for a single dream. On the contrary, it is because the dream in question seems to me to represent an endopsychic situation of a classic order, and indeed of a basic character which entitles it to be regarded as the paradigm of all endopsychic situations. For convenience, the general features of this situation are illustrated in the accompanying diagram.

Figure 1

CE, Central Ego; IS, Internal Saboteur; LE, Libidinal Ego; RO, Rejecting Object; NO, Needed Object. Cs, Conscious; Pcs, Preconscious; Ucs, Unconscious. ®, Aggression; =, Libido.



THE BASIC ENDOPSYCHIC SITUATION AND A REVISED THEORY OF MENTAL STRUCTURE FOUNDED THEREON

I myself feel convinced that the basic endopsychic situation above described is the situation underlying Freud's description of the mental apparatus in terms of ego, id, and super-ego. It is certainly the endopsychic situation upon which I deliberately base the revised theory of mental structure which I now submit, and which is couched in terms of central ego, libidinal ego and internal saboteur. As it would, of course, be natural to expect, there is a general correspondence between Freud's concepts and those which I have

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[3]Freud's conception of the ego was, of course, borrowed from Groddeck; but, if there is any truth in the conclusions which will shortly be recorded, it is a conception based upon an endopsychic situation resulting from repression, and therefore is anomalous in terms of Freud's own views, since it implies that repression is responsible for the origin of the ego.

now come to adopt. In the case of 'the central ego' the correspondence to Freud's 'ego' is fairly close from a functional standpoint; but there are important differences between the two concepts. Unlike Freud's 'ego', the 'central ego' is not conceived as originating out of something else (the 'id'), or as constituting a passive structure dependent for its activity upon impulses proceeding from the matrix out of which it originated, and on the surface of which it rests.[3] On the contrary, the 'central ego' is conceived as a primary and dynamic structure, from which, as we shall shortly see, the other mental structures are subsequently derived. The 'libidinal ego' corresponds, of course, to Freud's 'id'; but, whereas according to Freud's view the 'ego' is a derivative of the 'id', according to my view the 'libidinal ego' (which corresponds to the 'id') is a

derivative of the 'central ego' (which corresponds to the 'ego'). The 'libidinal ego' also differs from the 'id' in that it is conceived, not as a mere reservoir of instinctive impulses, but as a dynamic structure comparable to the 'central ego', although differing from the latter in various respects, e.g. in its more infantile character, in a lesser degree of organization, in a smaller measure of adaptation to reality and in a greater devotion to internalized objects. The 'internal saboteur' differs from the 'super-ego' in a number of respects. For one thing it is in no sense conceived as an internal object. It is wholly an ego structure, although, as we have seen, it is very closely associated with an internal object. Actually, the 'super-ego' corresponds not so much to the 'internal saboteur' as to a compound of this structure and its associated object (like the figure of the actress in the dream). At the same time, the 'internal saboteur' is unlike the 'super-ego' in that it is conceived as, in itself, devoid of all moral significance. Thus I do not attribute the affect of guilt to its activity, although this activity is unquestionably a prolific source of anxiety. Such anxiety may, of course, merge with guilt; but the two affects are theoretically distinct. Here it should be noted that, whilst introducing the conception of the internal saboteur, I am not prepared to abandon the conception of the super-ego as I have now come to abandon that of the id. On the contrary, it seems to me impossible to offer any satisfactory psychological explanation of guilt in the absence of the super-ego; but the super-ego must be regarded as originating at a higher level of mental organization than that at which the internal saboteur operates. Exactly how the activities of the two structures are related must in the meantime remain an open question; but for the most recent expression of my views regarding the origin and the function of the super-ego I must refer the reader to another article (1943).

SPLITTING OF THE EGO AND REPRESSION CONSIDERED AS ASPECTS OF AN IDENTICAL PROCESS OPERATIVE IN BOTH SCHIZOID AND HYSTERICAL CONDITIONS

Before proceeding to consider the origin of what I have called 'the basic endopsychic situation', I feel it necessary to record some general conclusions which seem to follow from the inherent nature of the situation itself. The first and most obvious of these conclusions is that the ego is split. In this respect, therefore, the basic endopsychic situation which has now emerged conforms to the pattern of the schizoid position—a position which, as already indicated, I have come to regard as central (in preference to the depressive position). Freud's theory of the mental apparatus was, of course, developed upon a basis of the depressive position; and it is on a similar basis that Melanie Klein has developed her views. By contrast, it is the schizoid position that constitutes the basis of the theory of mental structure which I now advance. It is to be noted, further, that, whilst conforming to the pattern of the schizoid position, the endopsychic situation revealed in my patient's dream also provided a satisfactory explanation of the dreamer's hysterical frigidity in terms of dynamic structure. Here we are reminded of the common association of hysterical symptoms with an underlying schizoid attitude—an association to which reference has already been made. There would, accordingly, appear to be good grounds for our second conclusion—that hysterical developments are inherently based upon an underlying and fundamental schizoid position. Our third conclusion follows from what has already been said regarding the aggressive attitude of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos. It is to the effect that the splitting of the ego observed in the schizoid position is due to the operation of a certain volume of aggression which remains at the disposal of the central ego. It is this aggression that provides the dynamic of the severance of the subsidiary egos from the central ego. The subsidiary egos are, of course, ordinarily unconscious; and their unconscious status at once raises the suspicion that they are subject to repression. This is obviously so in the case of the libidinal ego (which corresponds to Freud's id); but, if one of the subsidiary ego structures can be repressed, there is no reason for regarding the other as immune from similar treatment at the hands of the central ego. Consequently our fourth conclusion is that the internal saboteur (which largely corresponds to Freud's super-ego in function) is repressed no less than the libidinal ego. This conclusion may at

first sight appear to be in conflict with the theory which I previously advanced (1943), to the effect that repression is primarily directed against bad internalized objects. There is no real inconsistency, however; for I regard the repression of the subsidiary egos, which I now envisage, as secondary to the repression of bad internalized objects. Here we find a helpful analogy in the attack of the internal saboteur on the libidinal ego; for, as we have seen, the aggression involved in this attack is primarily directed against the needed object to which the libidinal ego is related, and only secondarily against the libidinal ego itself. Similarly, I regard repression of the libidinal ego on the part of the central ego as secondary to repression of the needed object. Our fifth conclusion needs no elaboration in the light of what precedes. It is to the effect that the dynamic of repression is aggression. Our sixth, and last, conclusion, which follows equally from preceding conclusions, is that splitting of the ego, on the one hand, and repression of the subsidiary egos by the central ego, on the other, constitute essentially the same phenomenon considered from different points of view. Here it is apposite to recall that, whilst the concept of splitting of the ego was formulated by Bleuler in an attempt to explain the phenomena of what was known as 'dementia præcox' until he introduced the term 'schizophrenia' to take its place, the concept of repression was formulated by Freud in an attempt to explain the phenomena of hysteria. Our final conclusion thus serves to substantiate the view that the position underlying the development of hysterical symptoms is essentially a schizoid position.

THE ORIGIN OF THE BASIC ENDOPSYCHIC SITUATION AND OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF EGOS

It is now time for us to turn our attention to questions regarding the origin of the basic endopsychic situation which found a classic expression in my patient's dream. In the light of considerations which have already emerged, it will be obvious that whatever explanation we may reach regarding the origin of this situation will also serve as an explanation of the origin of the schizoid position, the origin of repression and the differentiation of the various fundamental endopsychic structures. As we have seen, the patient whose dream has occupied so much of our attention was essentially ambivalent towards her husband as an external object; and it is from the establishment of a state of ambivalence towards external objects in early life that the basic endopsychic situation springs. The first libidinal object of the infant is, of course, his mother's breast, although there can be no doubt that the form of his mother as a person soon begins to take shape round the original nucleus of this maternal organ. Under theoretically perfect conditions the libidinal relationship of the infant to his mother would be so satisfactory that a state of libidinal frustration could hardly arise; and, as I see it, there would consequently be no ambivalence on the part of the infant towards his object. At this point I must explain that, whilst I regard aggression as a primary dynamic factor in that it does not appear capable of being resolved into libido (as Jung, for example, sought to resolve it), at the same time I regard it as ultimately subordinate to libido, not only metaphysically, but also psychologically. Thus I do not consider that the infant directs aggression spontaneously towards his libidinal object in the absence of frustration; and my observation of the behaviour of animals confirms me in this view. It should be added that in a state of nature the infant would never normally experience that separation from his mother which appears to be imposed upon him increasingly by conditions of civilization. Indeed, it may be inferred that in a state of nature it would be rare for the infant to be deprived of the shelter of his mother's arms and of ready access to her breast until, in the ordinary course of development, he himself became increasingly disposed to dispense with them.[4] Such perfect conditions are, however, only theoretically possible for the human infant born into a cultural group; and in actual fact the libidinal relationship of the infant to his mother is disturbed from the first by a considerable measure of frustration, although, of course, the degree of such frustration varies in different cases. It is the experience of libidinal frustration that calls forth the infant's aggression in relation to his libidinal object and thus gives rise to a state of ambivalence. To content ourselves with saying simply that the infant becomes ambivalent would, however, be to give an incomplete and partial picture of the situation which now arises; for it would be a picture conceived exclusively from the point of view of the observer. From the point of view of the infant himself it is a case of his mother becoming an

ambivalent object, i.e. an object which is both good and bad. Since it proves intolerable to him to have a good object which is also bad, he seeks to alleviate the situation by splitting the figure of his mother into two objects. Then, in so far as she satisfies him libidinally, she is a good object, and, in so far as she fails to satisfy him libidinally, she is a bad object. The situation in which he now finds himself placed proves, however, in its turn to be one which imposes a severe strain upon his capacity for endurance and his power of adjustment. Being

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[4]It must be recognized, of course, that, under any conditions, a profound sense of separation and loss of security must be experienced by the infant at the time of birth; and it may be presumed that some measure of aggression, in addition to anxiety, is called forth by this experience. There is no reason, however, to think that this experience in itself would give rise to a state of ambivalence in the absence of further experience of libidinal frustration during infancy.

a situation in outer reality, it is one which he finds himself impotent to control, and which, accordingly, he seeks to mitigate by such means as are at his disposal. The means at his disposal are limited; and the technique which he adopts is more or less dictated by this limitation. He accordingly follows the only path open to him and, since outer reality seems unyielding, he does his best to transfer the traumatic factor in the situation to the field of inner reality, within which he feels situations to be more under his own control. This means that he internalizes his mother as a bad object. Here I would remind the reader that, in my opinion, it is always the bad object (i.e., at this stage, the unsatisfying object) that is internalized in the first instance; for (as already indicated in a footnote) I find it difficult to attach any meaning to the primary internalization of a good object which is both satisfying and amenable from the infant's point of view. There are those, of course, who would argue that it would be natural for the infant, when in a state of deprivation, to internalize the good object on the wish-fulfilment principle; but, as it seems to me, internalization of objects is essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the satisfying object, but the unsatisfying object that the infant seeks to coerce. I speak here of 'the satisfying object' and 'the unsatisfying object', rather than of 'the good object' and 'the bad object', because I consider that, in this connection, the terms 'good object' and 'bad object' tend to be misleading. They tend to be misleading because they are liable to be understood in the sense of 'desired object' and 'undesired object' respectively. There can be no doubt, however, that a bad object may be desired. Indeed it is just because the infant's bad object is desired as well as felt to be bad that it is internalized. The trouble is that it remains bad after it has been internalized, i.e. it remains unsatisfying. At this point an important consideration arises. Unlike the satisfying object, the unsatisfying object has, so to speak, two facets. On the one hand, it frustrates; and, on the other hand, it tempts and allures. Indeed its essential 'badness' consists precisely in the fact that it combines allurement with frustration. Further, it retains both these qualities after internalization. After internalizing the unsatisfying object, accordingly, the infant finds himself in the quandary of 'out of the frying-pan into the fire'. In his attempts to control the unsatisfying object, he has introduced into the inner economy of his mind an object which not only continues to frustrate his need, but also continues to whet it. He thus finds himself confronted with another intolerable situation—this time an internal one. How does he seek to deal with it? As we have seen, in his attempt to deal with the intolerable external situation with which he was originally faced his technique was to split the maternal object into two objects, (a) the 'good' and (b) the 'bad', and then proceed to internalize the bad object; and in his attempt to deal with the intolerable internal situation which subsequently arises he adopts a technique which is not altogether dissimilar. He splits the bad internal object into two objects—(a) the tempting or needed object and (b) the frustrating object; and then he represses both these objects (employing aggression, of course, as the dynamic of repression). Here a complication arises, however; for his libidinal attachment to the undivided object is shared, albeit not in equal proportions, by the objects resulting from division. The consequence is that, in the process of repressing the resultant objects, the ego, so to speak, develops pseudopodia by means of which it still maintains libidinal attachments to the objects

undergoing repression. The development of these pseudopodia represents the initial stage of a division of the ego. As repression of the objects proceeds, the incipient division of the ego becomes an accomplished fact. The two pseudopodia are rejected by the part of the ego which remains central on account of their connection with the rejected objects; and with their associated objects they share the fate of repression. It is in this way that the two subsidiary egos, the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur, come to be split off from the central ego, and that a multiplicity of egos arises.

THE *DIVIDE ET IMPERA* TECHNIQUE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF LIBIDO AND AGGRESSION

It will be noted that the situation resulting from the sequence of processes which has just been described has now assumed the *structural* pattern of what I have called 'the basic endopsychic situation'. It has also assumed the *dynamic* pattern of this situation except in one important respect—that the aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and its associated object (the needed object) is still left out of the picture. In order to explain the origin of this feature of the situation, we must return to the original ambivalence of the child towards his mother and consider from a fresh angle what this involves. This time we shall consider the child's reactions, less in their conative, and more in their affective aspect. It is natural for the child, not only to be impulsive, but also to express his feelings in no uncertain terms. Moreover, it is through the expression of his feelings that he makes his chief impression upon his objects. Once ambivalence has been established, however, the expression of feeling towards his mother involves him in a position which must seem to him singularly precarious. Here it must be pointed out that what presents itself to him from a strictly conative standpoint as *frustration* at the hands of his mother presents itself to him in a very different light from a strictly affective standpoint. From the latter standpoint, what he experiences is a sense of lack of love, and indeed emotional *rejection*

on his mother's part. This being so, the expression of hate towards her as a rejecting object becomes in his eyes a very dangerous procedure. On the one hand, it is calculated to make her reject him all the more, and thus to increase her 'badness' and make her seem *more real* in her capacity of bad object. On the other hand, it is calculated to make her love him less, and thus to decrease her 'goodness' and make her seem *less real* (i.e. destroy her) in her capacity of good object. At the same time, it also becomes a dangerous procedure for the child to express his libidinal need, i.e. his nascent love, of his mother in face of rejection at her hands; for it is equivalent to discharging his libido into an emotional vacuum. Such a discharge is accompanied by an affective experience which is singularly devastating. In the older child this experience is one of intense humiliation over the depreciation of his love, which seems to be involved. At a somewhat deeper level (or at an earlier stage) the experience is one of shame over the display of needs which are disregarded or belittled. In virtue of these experiences of humiliation and shame he feels reduced to a state of worthlessness, destitution or beggardom. His sense of his own value is threatened; and he feels bad in the sense of 'inferior'. The intensity of these experiences is, of course, proportionate to the intensity of his need; and intensity of need itself increases his sense of badness by contributing to it the quality of 'demanding too much'. At the same time his sense of badness is further complicated by the sense of utter impotence which he also experiences. At a still deeper level (or at a still earlier stage) the child's experience is one of, so to speak, exploding ineffectively and being completely emptied of libido. It is thus an experience of disintegration and of imminent psychical death.

We can understand accordingly how precarious a matter it becomes for the child, when confronted with the experience of rejection by his mother, to express either aggressive or libidinal affect towards her. Reduced to its simplest terms, the position in which he finds himself placed would appear to be one in which, if, on the one hand, he expresses aggression, he is threatened with loss of his good object, and, if, on the other hand, he expresses libidinal need,

he is threatened with the loss of his libido (which for him constitutes his own goodness) and ultimately with loss of the ego structure which constitutes himself. Of these two threats by which the child feels menaced, the former (i.e. loss of the good object) would appear to be that which gives rise to the affect of depression, and which provides a basis for the subsequent development of a melancholic state in individuals for whom the disposal of aggression presents greater difficulties than the disposal of libido. On the other hand, the latter threat (i.e. loss of libido and of ego structure) would appear to be that which gives rise to the affect of futility, and which provides a basis for the subsequent development of a schizoid state in individuals for whom the disposal of libido presents greater difficulties than the disposal of aggression.

So far as the ætiology of depressive and schizoid states is concerned, views similar to those just indicated have already been developed by me at some length previously (1941). In the present instance, however, our immediate concern is with the measures adopted by the child to circumvent the various dangers which appear to him to attend the expression of affect, whether libidinal or aggressive, towards his mother when he is faced with the experience of rejection at her hands. As we have already seen, he attempts to deal with the ambivalent situation successively (1) by splitting the figure of his mother into two objects, a good and a bad, (2) by internalizing the bad object in an endeavour to control it, (3) by splitting the bad internalized object in turn into two objects, viz. (a) the tempting or needed object, and (b) the rejecting object, (4) by repressing both these objects and employing a certain volume of his aggression in the process, and (5) by employing a further volume of his aggression in splitting off from his central ego and repressing two subsidiary egos which remain attached to these respective internalized objects by libidinal ties. These various measures, based upon the techniques of internalization and splitting, serve to mitigate the asperities of the situation resulting from the child's experience of frustration in his relationship with his mother and his sense of rejection at her hands; but, except in the most extreme cases, they do not succeed in eliminating the child's need of his mother as an object in outer reality, or in robbing her of all significance—which, after all, is just as well. In conformity with this fact, his libido and his aggression are very far from being wholly absorbed in the processes so far described; and, consequently, the risks involved in the expression of libidinal and aggressive affect towards his mother as a rejecting object still remain to be met. The measures so far described thus require to be supplemented. Actually they are supplemented by a very obvious technique which is closely akin to the well-known principle of '*Divide et impera*'. The child seeks to circumvent the dangers of expressing both libidinal and aggressive affect towards his object by using a maximum of his aggression to subdue a maximum of his libidinal need. In this way he reduces the volume of affect, both libidinal and aggressive, demanding outward expression. As has already been pointed out, of course, neither libido nor aggression can be considered as existing in a state of divorce from structure. Accordingly, what remains for us to decide is to which of the ego structures already described the child's excess of libido and excess of aggression are to be respectively allotted. This is a question to which the answer can be in no doubt. The excess of libido is taken over by the libidinal

ego; and the excess of aggression is taken over by the internal saboteur. The child's technique of using aggression to subdue libidinal need thus resolves itself into an attack by the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego. The libidinal ego in its turn directs the excess of libido with which it becomes charged towards its associated object, the needed object. On the other hand, the attack of the internal saboteur upon this object represents a persistence of the child's original resentment towards his mother as a temptress inciting the very need which she fails to satisfy and thus reducing him to bondage—just as, indeed, the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego represents a persistence of the hatred which the child comes to feel towards himself for the dependence dictated by his need. It should be added that the processes just described take place simultaneously with those which they are designed to supplement, although, in the interests of clarity of exposition, they have been described separately.

DIRECT REPRESSION, LIBIDINAL RESISTANCE AND INDIRECT REPRESSION

Now that the origin of the aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and the needed object has been described, our account of the processes which determine the dynamic pattern of the basic endopsychic situation is complete. At this point, however, something requires to be added to what has already been said regarding the nature and origin of repression. In terms of the line of thought so far developed, repression is a process originating in a rejection of both the needed object and the rejecting object on the part of the undivided ego. This primary process of repression is accompanied by a secondary process of repression whereby the ego splits off and rejects two parts of itself, which remain attached respectively to one and the other of the repressed internal objects. The resulting situation is one in which the central ego (the residue of the undivided ego) adopts an attitude of rejection, not only towards the needed object and the rejecting object, but also towards the split off and subsidiary egos attached to these respective objects, i.e. the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur. This attitude of rejection adopted by the central ego constitutes repression; and the dynamic of the rejection is aggression. So far so good. But this explanation of the nature and origin of repression is incomplete in so far as it has not yet taken into account what is involved in the technique of reducing the volume of libido and aggression available for expression towards external objects by employing a maximum of aggression to subdue a maximum of libido. As we have seen, this technique resolves itself into a process whereby (a) the excess of aggression is taken over by the internal saboteur and devoted to an attack upon the libidinal ego, and (b) the excess of libido is taken over by the libidinal ego and directed towards the needed object. When the full significance of this process is considered, it becomes at once plain that the relentless attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego must operate as a very powerful factor in furthering the aims of repression. Indeed, so far as dynamic is concerned, it seems more than likely that this is the most important factor in the maintenance of repression. Obviously it is upon the phenomenon just mentioned that Freud's conception of the super-ego and its repressive functions is based; for the uncompromising hostility which, according to Freud, characterizes the attitude of the super-ego towards id impulses coincides exactly with the uncompromisingly aggressive attitude adopted by the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego. Similarly, Freud's observation that the self-reproaches of the melancholic are ultimately reproaches directed against the loved object falls readily into line with the aggressive attitude adopted towards the needed object by the internal saboteur.

There is no need at this point to repeat the criticisms already passed upon Freud's conceptions of the super-ego and the id, and upon all that is involved in these conceptions. It does, however, seem desirable to draw attention to the fact that, in his description of repression, Freud left completely out of account all that is involved in the phenomenon which I have described as the attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object. As we have seen, this attachment comes to absorb a considerable volume of libido. Further, the volume of libido in question is directed towards an object which is both internal and repressed; and, in conformity with this fact, it is inevitably oriented away from outer reality. Such being the case, the object-seeking of the libidinal ego operates as a resistance which powerfully reinforces the resistance directly resulting from repression, and which is thus no less in conflict with therapeutic aims than is the latter resistance. This is a theme which I have already developed, *mutatis mutandis*, elsewhere (1943). I add the proviso *'mutatis mutandis'* here, because, at the time when I wrote the article referred to, I had not yet formulated my present views regarding endopsychic structures; but the effect of these latter views is to give greater point, rather than otherwise, to the original theme. This theme is, of course, in direct conflict with Freud's statement (1920), (19): 'The unconscious, i.e. the "repressed" material, offers no resistance whatever to curative efforts.' It is, however, a theme which develops naturally out of the view that libido is primarily object-seeking, once we come to consider what happens when the object sought is a repressed internal object; and, in terms of my present standpoint, there can be no room for doubt that the obstinate attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object and its reluctance to renounce this object constitute a

particularly formidable source of resistance—and one which plays no small part in determining what is known as the negative therapeutic reaction. The attachment in question, being libidinal in character, cannot, of course, be regarded as in itself a repressive phenomenon; but, whilst itself a resultant of repression exercised by the central ego, it also functions as a powerful aid to this process of repression. The attack of the internal saboteur upon the object of the libidinal ego (the needed object) serves, of course, to perpetuate the attachment of the libidinal ego to its object by virtue of the fact that this object is being constantly threatened. Here we catch a glimpse of the original wolf under its sheep's clothing, i.e. we catch a glimpse of the original ambivalent situation persisting underneath all its disguises; for what the obstinate attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object and the equally obstinate aggression of the internal saboteur towards the same object really represent is the obstinacy of the original ambivalent attitude. The truth is that, however well the fact may be disguised, the individual is extremely reluctant to abandon his original hate, no less than his original need, of his original objects in childhood. This holds particularly true of psychoneurotic and psychotic individuals, not to mention those who fall into the category of psychopathic personality.

If the attachment of the libidinal ego to the needed object serves as a powerful aid to repression, the same may equally be said of the aggressive attitude adopted towards this internal object by the internal saboteur. So far as the actual process if repression is concerned, however, the latter differs from the former in one important respect; for not only does it forward the aim of repression, but it also actually operates in the same manner as repression. In its attack upon the needed object it performs a function which constitutes it a cobelligerent, albeit not an ally, of the central ego, whose repression of the needed object represents, as we have seen, a manifestation of aggression. The internal saboteur functions further as a cobelligerent of the central ego in respect of its attack upon the libidinal ego—an attack which serves to supplement that involved in the repression of this ego by the central ego. There is a sense, therefore, in which it would be true to say that the attacks of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego and upon its associated object represent an *indirect form of repression*, whereby the direct repression of these structures by the central ego is both supplemented and facilitated.

As we have already seen, the subsidiary egos owe their origin to a split of the undivided ego: but, as we have also seen, what presents itself from a topographic standpoint as simply a split of the ego presents itself from a dynamic standpoint as an active rejection and repression of both the subsidiary egos on the part of the central ego. It thus becomes a matter for some comment that, whilst both the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur share a common fate so far as direct repression is concerned, only one of the subsidiary egos, viz. the libidinal ego, should be subjected to the process of indirect repression. When the difference between direct and indirect repression is considered in the light of what has already been said, it is, of course, plain that the process of repression described by Freud corresponds very much more closely to what I have described as indirect repression than to what I have described as direct repression. Nevertheless, when Freud's conception of repression is compared with my conception of the total phenomenon of repression, both direct and indirect, this common feature may be detected—that the libidinal components in the psyche are subjected to a much greater measure of repression than the aggressive components. There can be no doubt, of course, that the repression of aggressive components does occur: but it is difficult to see how this fact can be consistently explained in terms of Freud's theory of the mental apparatus. This theory, conceived as it is in terms of a fundamental divorce between impulse and structure, would appear to permit only of the repression of libido: for, in terms of Freud's theory, the repression of aggression would involve the anomaly of aggression being used to repress aggression. By contrast, if, in conformity with the point of view which I advocate, we conceive of impulse as inseparable from structure and as representing simply the dynamic aspect of structure, the repression of aggressive components in the psyche is no more difficult to account for than the repression of libidinal components. It then becomes a question, not of aggression repressing aggression, but of one ego structure using aggression to repress another ego structure charged

with aggression. This being so, my view to the effect that the internal saboteur, no less than the libidinal ego, is repressed by the central ego provides a satisfactory explanation of the repression of aggressive components. At the same time, the fact that libidinal components are subject to a greater measure of repression than aggressive components is satisfactorily explained by means of the conception of indirect repression. The truth would appear to be that, if the *principle of repression* governs the disposal of excess libido in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess aggression, the *principle of topographical redistribution* governs the disposal of *excess aggression* in greater measure than it governs the disposal of excess libido.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ŒDIPUS SITUATION

I have already said enough to indicate that the technique whereby aggression is employed to subdue libido is a process which finds a common place in Freud's conception of 'repression' and my

own conception of 'indirect repression'. At the same time, my views regarding the origin of this technique differ from those of Freud. According to Freud, the technique originates as a means of averting the expression of libidinal (incestuous) impulses towards one parent and aggressive (parenticidal) impulses towards the other parent in the setting of the Œdipus situation. According to my view, on the other hand, the technique originates in infancy as a means of averting the expression of both libido and aggression on the part of the infant towards his mother, who at this stage constitutes his only significant object, and upon whom he is wholly dependent. This discrepancy of views will be interpreted, quite correctly, in the sense that I have departed from Freud in my evaluation of the Œdipus situation as an explanatory concept. For Freud, the Œdipus situation is, so to speak, an ultimate cause; but this is a view with which I no longer find it possible to agree. So far from agreeing, I now consider that the rôle of ultimate cause, which Freud allotted to the Œdipus situation, should properly be allotted to the phenomenon of infantile dependence. In conformity with this standpoint, the Œdipus situation presents itself, not so much in the light of a causal phenomenon as in the light of an end-product. It is not a basic situation, but the derivative of a situation which has priority over it not only in the logical, but also in the temporal sense. This prior situation is one which issues directly out of the physical and emotional dependence of the infant upon his mother, and which declares itself in the relationship of the infant to his mother long before his father becomes a significant object. The present is no occasion for an elaboration of the views which I have now reached regarding the Œdipus situation—views which have been in some measure adumbrated already (1941). Nevertheless, in view of the comparison which I have just drawn between my own conception of repression and Freud's conception, formulated as it is in terms of the Œdipus situation, it seems desirable that I should indicate briefly how I propose to introduce this classic situation into the general scheme which I have outlined. It will hardly be necessary to remind the reader that I have dispensed with the Œdipus situation as an explanatory concept not only in my account of the origin of repression, but also in my account of the genesis of the basic endopsychic situation and in my account of the differentiation of endopsychic structure. These accounts have been formulated exclusively in terms of the measures adopted by the child in an attempt to cope with the difficulties inherent in the ambivalent situation which develops during his infancy in his relationship with his mother as his original object. The various measures which the child adopts in his attempt to deal with this ambivalent situation have all been adopted before the Œdipus situation develops. It is in the setting of the child's relationship to his mother that the basic endopsychic situation is established, that the differentiation of endopsychic structure is accomplished and that repression is originated; and it is only after these developments have occurred that the child is called upon to meet the particular difficulties which attend the Œdipus situation. So far from furnishing an explanatory concept, therefore, the Œdipus situation is rather a phenomenon to be explained in terms of an endopsychic situation which has already developed.

The chief novelty introduced into the child's world by the Œdipus situation, as this materializes in outer reality, is that he is now confronted with two distinct parental objects instead of with only one as formerly. His relationship with his new object, viz. his father, is, of course, inevitably fraught with vicissitudes similar to those which he previously experienced in his relationship with his mother—and, in particular, the vicissitudes of need, frustration and rejection. In view of these vicissitudes, his father becomes an ambivalent object to him, whilst at the same time he himself becomes ambivalent towards his father. In his relationship with his father he is thus faced with the same problem of adjustment as that with which he was originally faced in his relationship with his mother. The original situation is reinstated, albeit this time in relation to a fresh object; and, very naturally, he seeks to meet the difficulties of the reinstated situation by means of the same series of techniques which he learned to adopt in meeting the difficulties of the original situation. He splits the figure of his father into a good and a bad object, internalizes the bad object and splits the internalized bad object into (a) a needed object associated with the libidinal ego and (b) a rejecting object associated with the internal saboteur. It should be added that the new paternal needed object would appear to be partly superimposed upon, and partly fused with the old maternal needed object, and that similarly the paternal rejecting object is partly superimposed upon, and partly fused with the maternal rejecting object.

The adjustment which the child is called upon to make in relation to his father differs, of course, in one important respect from that which he was previously called upon to make in relation to his mother. It differs in the extent to which it has to be achieved upon an emotional plane. The new adjustment must be almost exclusively emotional; for in his relationship with his father the child is necessarily precluded from the experience of feeding at the breast. We are thus introduced to a further important respect in which his adjustment to his father must differ from his previous adjustment to his mother. His father is a man, whereas his mother is a woman. It is more than doubtful, however, whether the child at first appreciates the genital difference between the two parents. It would appear rather that the difference

which he does appreciate is that his father has no breasts. His father thus first presents himself to the child as a parent without breasts; and this is one of the chief reasons that his relationship with his father has to be established so much more on an emotional plane than his relationship with his mother. On the other hand, it is because the child does have the experience of a physical relationship with his mother's breast, while also experiencing a varying degree of frustration in this relationship, that his need for his mother persists so obstinately beneath his need for his father and all subsequent genital needs. When the child comes to appreciate, in some measure at least, the genital difference between his parents, and as, in the course of his own development, his physical need tends to flow increasingly (albeit in varying degrees) through genital channels, his need for his mother comes to include a need for her vagina. At the same time, his need for his father comes to include a need for his father's penis. The strength of these physical needs for his parents' genitals varies, however, in inverse proportion to the satisfaction of his emotional needs. Thus, the more satisfactory his emotional relations with his parents, the less urgent are his physical needs for their genitals. These latter needs are, of course, never satisfied, although substitutive satisfactions may be sought, e.g. those of sexual curiosity. Consequently, some measure of ambivalence necessarily develops in relation to his mother's vagina and his father's penis. This ambivalence is reflected, incidentally, in sadistic conceptions of the primal scene. By the time the primal scene is envisaged, however, the relationships of his parents to one another have become a matter of moment for the child; and jealousy of each of his parents in relation to the other begins to assert itself. The chief incidence of his jealousy is, of course, partly determined by the biological sex of the child; but it is also in no small measure determined by the state of his emotional relationships with his respective parents. Be this as it may, the child is now called upon to meet the difficulties of two ambivalent situations at the same time; and he seeks to meet these difficulties by the familiar series of techniques. The result is that he internalizes both a bad maternal genital figure and a bad paternal genital figure and splits each of these into two figures, which are embodied

respectively in the structures of the needed object and the rejecting object. It will thus be seen that, before the child is very old, these internal objects have already assumed the form of complex composite structures. They are built up partly on a basis of the superimposition of one object upon another, and partly on a basis of the fusion of objects. The extent to which the internal objects are built up respectively on a basis of layering and on a basis of fusion differs, of course, from individual to individual; and the extent to which either layering or fusion predominates would appear to be a matter of no small importance. Thus, in conjunction with the proportioning of the various component objects, it would appear to play an important part in determining the psycho-sexual attitude of the individual in so far as this is not determined by biological sexual factors. Likewise, in conjunction with the proportioning of the component objects, it would appear to be the chief determining factor in the ætiology of the sexual perversions. We may thus envisage an ætiology of the perversions conceived in terms of object-relationship psychology.

It will be noticed that in the preceding account the personal pronoun employed to indicate the child has been consistently masculine. This must not be taken to imply that the account applies only to the boy. It applies equally to the girl; and the masculine pronoun has been used only because the advantages of a personal pronoun of some kind appear to outweigh those of the impersonal pronoun, however non-committal this may be. It will also be noticed that the classic Œdipus situation has not yet emerged. The stage which was last described was one at which, whilst the relations of his parents with one another had become significant to the child, his position was essentially one of ambivalence towards both parents. We have seen, however, that the child seeks to deal with both ambivalent situations by a series of processes in consequence of which genital figures of each of his parents come to be embodied both in the structure of the needed object and in that of the rejecting object. It must be recognized, of course, that the biological sex of the child must play some part in determining his attitude to his respective parents; but that this is very far from being the sole determining factor is obvious from the frequency of inverted and mixed Œdipus situations. Considered in terms of the views which I have outlined, these inverted and mixed Œdipus situations must necessarily be determined by the constitution of the needed object and the rejecting object. It is, therefore, only taking a further step in the same direction to conclude that the same consideration applies to the positive Œdipus situation. The fact then would appear to be *that the Œdipus situation is not really an external situation at all, but an internal situation* —one which may be transferred in varying degrees to the actual external situation. Once the Œdipus situation comes to be regarded as essentially an internal situation, it is not difficult to see that the maternal components of both the internal objects have, so to speak, a great initial advantage over the paternal components; and this, of course, applies to children of both sexes. The strong position of the maternal components is, of course, due to the fact that the nuclei of both the internal objects are derivatives of the original ambivalent mother and her ambivalent breasts. In conformity with this fact, of *sufficiently deep analysis of the Œdipus situation*

invariably reveals that this situation is built up around the figures of an internal needed mother and an internal rejecting mother. It was, of course, on a basis of hysterical phenomena that Freud originally formulated the concept of the Œdipus situation; and according to Abraham's 'phase' theory the origin of hysteria is to be traced to a fixation in the genital (phallic) phase. I have already (1941) passed various criticisms on Abraham's 'phase' theory; and so I shall be merely passing a further criticism, if only by implication, when I say that I have yet to analyse the hysteric, male or female, who does not turn out to be an inveterate breast-seeker at heart. I venture to suggest that the deep analysis of a positive Œdipus situation may be regarded as taking place at three main levels. At the first level the picture is dominated by the Œdipus situation itself. At the next level it is dominated by ambivalence towards the heterosexual parent; and at the deepest level it is dominated by ambivalence towards the mother. Traces of all these stages may be detected in the classic drama of Hamlet ; but there can be no doubt that, both in the rôle of needed and tempting object and in that of rejecting object, the Queen is the

real villain of the piece. The position then would appear to be this. The child finds it intolerable enough to be called upon to deal with a single ambivalent object; but, when he is called upon to deal with two, he finds it still more intolerable. He, therefore, seeks to simplify a complex situation, in which he finds himself confronted with two needed objects and two rejecting objects, by converting it into one in which he will only be confronted with a single needed object and a single rejecting object; and he achieves this aim, with, of course, a varying measure of success, by concentrating upon the needed aspect of one parent and the rejecting aspect of the other. He thus, for all practical purposes, comes to equate one parental object with the needed object, and the other with the rejecting object; and by so *doing the child constitutes the Œdipus situation for himself*. Ambivalence to both parents persists, however, in the background; and at rock bottom both the needed object and the rejecting object remain what they originally were, viz. figures of his mother.

NEUROTIC ANXIETY AND HYSTERICAL SUFFERING

I have spoken of the *divide et impera* technique as a means of reducing the volume of affect (both libidinal and aggressive) which demands outward expression; and at this point it would be both relevant and profitable to consider in some detail what happens when the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego fails to subdue libidinal need sufficiently to meet the requirements of the central ego, i.e. sufficiently to reduce the volume of available libidinal affect to manageable proportions. It is impossible, however, to embark upon so large a theme on the present occasion. Suffice it to say that, when the technique in question does not succeed in reducing the volume of libidinal affect sufficiently and so fails to fulfil its primary function, it appears to assume a secondary function, in virtue of which it imposes a change of quality upon such libidinal affect as insists upon emerging and thereby disguises the quality of the original affect. Thus, when the dynamic tension within the libidinal ego rises above a certain threshold value and an excess of libidinal need threatens to assert itself, the emergent libidinal affect is converted into (neurotic) *anxiety* by the impact of the aggression which is directed against the libidinal ego by the internal saboteur. When the dynamic tension within the libidinal ego continues to rise until it reaches a further threshold value, it becomes no longer possible for a libidinal discharge to be averted; and the attack of the internal saboteur upon the libidinal ego then has the effect of imparting a *painful* quality to the libidinal affect accompanying the inevitable discharge. Such, at any rate, would appear to be the process involved in the hysterical mode of expressing affect—a process which demands that the expression of libidinal need shall be experienced as suffering.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DYNAMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS GENERAL SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

In the light of what has just been said regarding the genesis of (neurotic) anxiety, it will be noted that my conception of the nature of anxiety is closely in accord with Freud's original conception, viz. that anxiety is a converted form of undischarged libido. Here we find but one example of the somewhat remarkable fact that, if the general standpoint which I have now come to adopt represents a departure from some of Freud's later views, it has had the effect of revivifying some of Freud's earlier views (views which, in some cases, have latterly been in abeyance). The explanation of this general phenomenon would appear to be that, whilst at every point there is a recognizable analogy between my present views and those of Freud, the development of my views follows a path which diverges gradually from that followed by the historical development of Freud's views. This divergence of paths itself admits of only one explanation—a difference in certain basic theoretic principles. The central points of difference are not difficult to localize. They are two in number. In the first place, although Freud's whole system of thought was concerned with object-relationships, he adhered theoretically to the principle that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking, i.e. that it is directionless. By contrast, I adhere to the principle that libido is primarily object-seeking, i.e. that it has direction. For that

matter, I regard aggression as having direction also, whereas, by implication at any rate, Freud regards aggression

as, like libido, theoretically directionless. In the second place, Freud regards impulse (i.e. psychical energy) as theoretically distinct from structure, whereas I do not accept this distinction as valid and adhere to the principle of dynamic structure. Of these two central points of difference between Freud's views and those which I have now come to adopt, the latter is the more fundamental; and indeed the former would appear to depend upon the latter. Thus Freud's view that libido is primarily pleasure-seeking follows directly from his divorce of energy from structure; for, once energy is divorced from structure, the only psychical change which can be envisaged as other than disturbing, i.e. as pleasant, is one which makes for the establishment of an equilibrium of forces, i.e. a directionless change. By contrast, if we conceive of energy as inseparable from structure, then the only changes which are intelligible are changes in structural relationships and in relationships between structures; and such changes are essentially directional.

No man, even the greatest and most original, can remain wholly independent of the scientific background of his day; and it cannot be claimed that even Freud provides an exception to this rule. Here we must remind ourselves of the scientific atmosphere of the nineteenth century in which Freud was nurtured. This atmosphere was dominated by the Helmholtzian conception that the physical universe consisted in a conglomeration of inert, immutable and indivisible particles to which motion was imparted by a fixed quantity of energy separate from the particles themselves. The energy in question was conceived as having been, for some unknown reason, unevenly distributed at the beginning and as subsequently undergoing a gradual process of redistribution calculated to lead eventually to an equilibrium of forces and an immobilization of the solid particles. Such being the prevailing conception of the contemporary physicist, it is not difficult to understand how it came about that, when Freud, in advance of his time, set himself the arduous task of introducing order into the hitherto confused realm of psychopathology, he should have remained sufficiently under the influence of the scientific atmosphere of his day to conceive impulse (psychical energy) as separate from structure and to cast his libido theory in an equilibrium-seeking mould. In my opinion, however, this feature constitutes a limitation imposed by outside influences upon his thought, which otherwise represented an historic advance upon prevailing conceptions in the psychological field, and which was much more in the spirit of the new scientific outlook at present emerging; for during the twentieth century the scientific conception of the physical universe has already undergone a profound change. The inert and indivisible particles or atoms, of which the physical universe was formerly thought to be composed, are now known to be structures of the greatest complexity embodying almost incredible quantities of energy—energy in the absence of which the structures themselves would be unintelligible, but which is equally difficult to explain in the absence of the structures. This intra-atomic energy has effects which not only determine intra-atomic relationships, but also influence bodies at enormous distances. The most remarkable of these effects is radiation; and it has been found necessary to call in radiation to explain certain of the phenomena of light, which defied explanation on the basis of the wave theory of the previous scientific epoch. Interestingly enough, radiation has proved to possess at least one of the properties formerly regarded as a prerogative of solid matter, viz. mass; and the occurrence of radiation affects the structure of both the emitting and the receiving atoms. Further, the universe itself is conceived as undergoing a process of change other than that involved in the establishment of an equilibrium within a closed system. Thus it would appear that the universe is expanding at a terrific speed. The major forces at work are attraction and repulsion (cf. libido and aggression); but, although attraction has the effect of producing local condensations of matter, the dominant force, at any rate during the present phase, is repulsion. So far from being in process of establishing a non-directional equilibrium, therefore, the universe is in process of expanding towards a limit at which no further expansion will be possible and everything will be so attenuated that no further mutual influences will occur and nothing more will be able to happen.

The change which the universe is undergoing is thus a directional change. Such being the general scientific background of the present day, it seems to me a demand of the times, if nothing else, that our psychological ideas should be reformulated in terms of a relationship psychology conceived on a basis of dynamic structure.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DYNAMIC STRUCTURE AS AN EXPLANATORY SYSTEM

As an explanatory system, the psychology of dynamic structure which I envisage seems to me to have many advantages, among which by no means the least is that it provides a more satisfactory basis than does any other type of psychology for the explanation of group phenomena. However, this is a theme which, like certain others touched upon in this article, must be left for another occasion. It remains for me, in my concluding remarks, to say something regarding the advantages which appear to accrue from the particular theory of mental structure which I have advanced in place of Freud's classic theory. It is obvious, of course, that, from a topographic standpoint, Freud's theory only admits of the operation of three factors (id, ego and super-ego) in the production

of the variety of clinical states with which we are familiar. By contrast, my theory admits of the operation of five factors (central ego, libidinal ego, internal saboteur, needed object and rejecting object)—even when the super-ego as I conceive it is left out of account. My theory, accordingly, offers a greater range of ætiological possibilities. In actual practice, the difference between the two theories as regards ætiological possibilities is even greater than at first appears; for, of the three factors envisaged in Freud's theory, only two (the ego and the super-ego) are structures properly speaking—the third (viz. the id) being only a source of energy. The energy proceeding from the id is, of course, conceived by Freud as assuming two forms—libido and aggression. Consequently, Freud's theory admits of the operation of two structural and two dynamic factors in all. Freud's two dynamic factors find a place, of course, in my own theory; but, according to my theory, the number of the structural factors is not two, but five. Thus, with five structural factors and two dynamic factors to conjure with, my theory permits of a much greater range of permutations and combinations than does Freud's theory. Actually, however, the possibilities left open by Freud's theory in the abstract are still further limited by his conception of the function of the super-ego, which he regards not only as characteristically aggressive, but also as characteristically antilibidinal. According to Freud, therefore, the endopsychic drama largely resolves itself into a conflict between the ego in a libidinal capacity and the super-ego in an anti-libidinal capacity. The original dualism inherent in Freud's earliest views regarding repression thus remains substantially unaffected by his subsequent theory of mental structure. Such a conception of the endopsychic drama is unduly limiting, not only so far as its implications for social psychology are concerned (e.g. the implication that social institutions are primarily repressive), but also so far as concerns its explanatory value within the psychopathological and characterological fields. Within these fields explanation reduces itself to an account of the attitudes adopted by the ego in a libidinal capacity *vis-à-vis* the super-ego. By contrast, my theory possesses all the features of an explanatory system enabling psychopathological and characterological phenomena of all kinds to be described in terms of the patterns assumed by a complex of relationships between a variety of structures. It also possesses the advantage of enabling psychopathological symptoms to be explained directly in terms of structural conformations, and thus of doing justice to the unquestionable fact that, so far from being independent phenomena, symptoms are but expressions of the personality as a whole.

At this juncture it becomes necessary to point out (if indeed it has not already become sufficiently obvious) that the *basic* endopsychic situation which I have described, and to which I have attached such importance, is by no means conceived as immutable from the economic standpoint. From the topographic standpoint, it must be regarded as relatively immutable, although I conceive it as one of the chief aims of psycho-analytical therapy to introduce some

change into its topography by way of territorial adjustment. Thus I conceive it as among the most important functions of psycho-analytical therapy (a) to reduce the split of the original ego by restoring to the central ego a maximum of the territories ceded to the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur, and (b) to bring the needed object and the rejecting object so far as possible within the sphere of influence of the central ego. The extent to which such changes can be effected appears, however, to be strictly limited. In its economic aspect, by contrast, the basic endopsychic situation is capable of very extensive modification. In conformity with this fact, I conceive it as another of the chief aims of psycho-analytical therapy to reduce to a minimum (a) the attachment of the subsidiary egos to their respective associated objects, (b) the aggression of the central ego towards the subsidiary egos and their objects, and (c) the aggression of the internal saboteur towards the libidinal ego and its object. On the other hand, the basic endopsychic situation is undoubtedly capable of considerable modification in a psychopathological direction. As I have already indicated, the economic pattern of the basic endopsychic situation is the pattern which prevails in hysterical states. Of this I have no doubt whatsoever in my own mind. I have, however, come across cases of hysterical individuals who displayed remarkably paranoid traits (even to the point of having been previously diagnosed as paranoid), and who were found, on analysis, to oscillate between paranoid and hysterical attitudes. Such oscillations appeared to be accompanied by changes in the economic pattern of the endopsychic situation—the paranoid phases being characterized by a departure from the economic pattern of what I have called the basic endopsychic situation. What economic pattern the endopsychic situation assumes in the paranoid state I do not feel in a position to say; but I do venture to suggest that corresponding to every disinguishable clinical state there is a characteristic pattern of the endopsychic situation. It must be recognized, of course, that various patterns may exist side by side or be superimposed one upon the other. It must also be recognized that patterning of the endopsychic situation may either be rigid or flexible—extreme rigidity and extreme flexibility being alike unfavourable features. At the same time, it must be stressed that the basic (and original) endopsychic situation is that which is found in hysterical states. In conformity with this consideration, I take the view that the earliest psychopathological symptoms to

manifest themselves are hysterical in character; and I interpret the screaming fits of the infant in this sense. If I am right in this, Freud showed no mean insight in choosing hysterical phenomena as the material out of which to build the foundations of psycho-analytical theory.

In the light of considerations already advanced it will be understood, of course, that, although the basic endopsychic situation is the situation underlying hysterical states, it is itself the product of a split of the original ego and is, therefore, a schizoid phenomenon. Thus, although the earliest psychopathological *symptoms* are hysterical, the earliest psychopathological process is schizoid. Repression itself is a schizoid process; and splitting of the ego is a universal phenomenon, although, of course, the degree of such splitting varies in different individuals. It is not to be inferred, however, that overt schizoid states are the earliest psychopathological states to develop. On the contrary, the earliest of such states are hysterical in nature. An actual schizoid state is a much later development—one which only materializes when the schizoid process is pushed to a point at which a massive repression of affect occurs and even an hysterical expression of affect is thereby precluded. Thus it is only when a massive repression of affect occurs that the individual becomes unduly detached and experiences a pronounced sense of futility. What is involved in the development of schizoid states cannot, however, be discussed further on the present occasion.

THE DYNAMIC QUALITY OF INTERNALIZED OBJECTS

The feature of Freud's theory of the mental apparatus presenting the greatest anomaly is one to which reference has not yet been made. It is this—that the only part of the psyche which he describes in terms at all approximating to those of dynamic structure is the super-ego. The id is,

of course, described as a source of energy without structure; and the ego is described as a passive structure without energy except such as invades it from the id. By contrast, the super-ego is described as a structure endowed with a fund of energy. It is true that the energy in question is conceived as being ultimately derived from the id; but this in no way alters the fact that Freud attributes to the super-ego a considerable measure of independent functional activity. So much is this the case that he speaks of the super-ego and the id as diametrically opposed to one another in the aims of their activities, and of the ego as buffetted beween these two endopsychic entities. The odd thing about all this is that the super-ego is really only a naturalized alien, as it were, within the realm of the individual mind, an immigrant from outer reality. Its whole significance resides in the fact that it is essentially an internalized object. That the only part of the psyche which Freud treats as a dynamic structure should be an internalized object is, to my mind, an anomaly sufficient in itself to justify my attempt to formulate an alternative theory of psychical structure. It will be observed that, in formulating such an alternative theory, I have so far followed a line opposite to that followed by Freud in that, whereas an internalized object is the only part of the psyche which Freud treats as a dynamic structure, the internalized objects which I envisage are the only parts of the psyche which I have not treated as dynamic structures. I have treated the internalized objects simply as objects of the dynamic ego structures, i.e. as endopsychic structures which are not themselves dynamic. I have done this deliberately in order to bring into focus the activity of the ego structures which I find it necessary to postulate, and in order to avoid all risk of under-rating the primary importance of this activity; for, after all, it is only through this activity that objects ever come to be internalized. However, in the interests of consistency, I must now draw the logical conclusion of my theory of dynamic structure and acknowledge that, since internal objects are structures, they must necessarily be, in some measure at least, dynamic. In drawing this conclusion and making this acknow ledgment, I shall not only be here following the precedent of Freud, but also, it would seem, conforming to the demands of such psychological facts as are revealed, e.g. in dreams and in the phenomena of paranoia. This further step will enhance the explanatory value of my theory of mental structure by introducing additional possibilities into the endopsychic situation by way of permutation and combination. It must be recognized, however, that, in practice, it is very difficult to differentiate between the activity of internalized objects and the activity of the ego structures with which they are associated; and, with a view to avoiding any appearance of demonology, it seems wise to err, if anything, on the side of overweighting the activity of the ego structures rather than otherwise. It remains true, nevertheless, that under certain conditions internalized objects may acquire a dynamic independence which cannot be ignored.

NOTE

ERRATUM:—I take this, the first, opportunity to correct an unfortunate error which crept into my manuscript of 'A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Psychoneuroses', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal*., 22 (1941), 267, and which remained uncorrected in the proof. The word 'rejection' in the fourth line of p. 267 should read 'retention'. This error is particularly unfortunate since it reverses the sense.

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ON GENITAL LOVE[1]

MICHAEL BÁLINT

If one reads the psycho-analytical literature for references to genital love to one's surprise two striking facts emerge; (a) much less has been written on genital love than on pregenital love (e.g. 'genital love' is missing from the indices of Fenichel's new text-book[3]); and of Nunberg's *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre* [3]); (b) almost everything that has been written on genital love is negative like Abraham's description of his famous term 'postambivalent phase'. We know fairly well what an ambivalent love relation is—of postambivalent love we know hardly more than that it is, or at least ought to be, no longer ambivalent.

This emphasis on the negative qualities, i.e. on those which have, or ought to have been, superseded in the course of development blurs the whole picture. It is not the presence of certain positive qualities that is accentuated only the absence of certain others.

To avoid this pitfall let us examine an ideal case of such postambivalent genital love that has no traces of ambivalency and in addition no traces of pregenital object relationship:

a. There should be no greediness, no insatiability, no wish to devour the object, to deny it any independent existence, etc., i.e. there should be no *oral* features;

b. There should be no wish to hurt, to humiliate, to boss, to dominate the object, etc., i.e. no *sadistic* features;

c. There should be no wish to defile the partner, to despise him (her) for his (her) sexual desires and pleasures, there should be no danger of being disgusted by the partner or being attracted only by some unpleasant features of him, etc., i.e. there should be no remnants of anal traits;

d. There should be no compulsion to boast about the possession of a penis, no fear of the partner's sexual organs, no fear for one's own sexual organs, no envy of the male or female genitalia, no feeling of being incomplete or of having a faulty sexual organ, or of the partner having a faulty one, etc., i.e. there should be no trace of the phallic phase or of the castration complex.

We know that there is no such ideal case, but we have to get all this negative stuff out of our way before we can start with the proper examination.

What is then 'genital love' apart from the absence of all the enumerated 'pregenital' traits? Well, we love our partner

1. because he or she can satisfy us;

2. because we can satisfy him or her;

3. because we can experience a full orgasm together, nearly or quite simultaneously.

This seems very plain sailing, but unfortunately it is not so. Let us take the first condition, that our partner can satisfy us. This may be, and very likely is, rather egotistical, or even completely narcissistic. It entails hardly any regard for the partner's happiness. Such types are well known, they may be men or women alike. Their only aim is their own satisfaction which is truly genital and which obviously may or may not be coupled with love.

The same is true about the second condition, i.e. that we can satisfy our partner. This is certainly too altruistic, though not necessarily masochistic. Here only the object counts, and for this kind of love more or less complete disregard for one's own needs, interests and happiness is characteristic. Again there are many examples of this type too which may also be found in either men or women. And again, although the satisfaction is truly genital, it may or may not be coupled with love.

One could argue that these two types are not real love relations but this argument is faulty. Relations based on these two types of genital satisfaction may be truly harmonious for very long periods—even for life—especially if the types of love of the two partners are supplementary to each other.

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1 Paper read at the Conference of European Analysts in Amsterdam on May 26, 1947.
3 Nunberg, H.: *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre*., Berne, H. Huber, 1932.

These two types seem to have led us into a blind alley. The investigation of the third type may be more promising. If two partners love each other because they can find happiness together in one mutual experience, this truly must be the real love. But is this really so? There are many examples—in history, in the *chronique scandaleuse*, and in psycho-analytical practice—where the two partners have perfect sexual experience, find real happiness in each others' arms, where they feel an absolute security that whenever they meet they can give this happiness to each other and still—notwithstanding that they are called lovers—they do not love each other. Often quite the contrary is true, as in Shakespeare's famous 129th sonnet:

> *All this the world well knows; yet none knows well To shun this heaven that leads men to this hell*.

This attitude—irresistible desire for the partner before the act, inability to bear him after—is sometimes mutual, more frequently one-sided. Often the partner is not quite unbearable after the orgasm, only indifferent. And there are many intermediate forms too.

We expected that this form of genital relation would give us some idea what true genital love is; instead of it the result was disappointing. Genital satisfaction is apparently only a necessary and not a sufficient condition of genital love. What we have learned is that genital love is much more than gratitude for, or contentment about, the partner being available for genital satisfaction. Further that it does not make any difference whether this gratitude or contentment is onesided or mutual.

What is this more? We find in addition to the genital satisfaction in a true love relation

1. Idealization;

2. Tenderness;

3. A special form of identification.

As Freud[4] dealt with the problem of idealization, both of the object and of the instinct, I need only to repeat his findings. He showed convincingly firstly that idealization is not absolutely necessary, that also without idealization a good love relation is possible, and secondly that in many cases idealization is not a help but a hindrance to the development of a satisfactory form of love. Accordingly we may discard this condition too as not absolutely necessary.

It is different with the second phenomenon: tenderness (*Zärtlichkeit*). Since Freud first mentioned it the whole psycho-analytical literature uses this term in two different senses.

According to the first[5] tenderness is the result of aim-inhibition. In fact tenderness is the most quoted example of aim-inhibition: the original urge was directed towards a certain aim, but—for one reason or another—had to content itself with only partial satisfaction, i.e. with much less than the intended aim. According to this notion tenderness is a secondary phenomenon, a faint representative only of the original aim; and because of this quality of *faute de mieux* it never leads to full satisfaction, i.e. it is always and inherently connected with some frustration.

According to the second notion[6] tenderness is an archaic quality which appears in conjunction with the ancient self-preserving instincts, and has no further aim, only this quiet, not passionate gratification. Consequently passionate love must be a secondary phenomenon, superimposed on the archaic tender love.

This second idea can be supported by some suggestive data from anthropology. In general, different forms of civilization may be grouped in two types. In the first type we find passionate love, idealization of the object or of the instinct, a strict social enforcement of the latency, courting, abundant love-songs and love poetry, sexual hypocrisy, appreciation of tenderness, and usually well-developed complicated *ars amandi*. In the second type the society does not seem to care much about enforcing a latency, in fact there is hardly any social demand for sexual abstention at any age; there is hardly any courting, hardly any love-songs, and very poor love poetry, very little idealization, not much tenderness, but there is straightforward, simple, uncomplicated genital sexuality. Perhaps both passion and excessive tenderness are 'artificial', products of civilization, the result of systematic training by frustration during education. The apparent contradiction in Freud's two uses of the term 'tenderness' could thus be reconciled; tenderness is not a secondary aim-inhibition but an inhibited development.

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[4] Freud, S.: 'The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life.' *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV. London, Hogarth Press, 1925.
[5] Freud, S.: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sexuality*. New York, 1910.
[6] Freud, S.: 'The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life, ' *Collected Papers* Vol. IV. London Hogarth Press, 1925.

Etymology, too, seems to support this idea. The German zart, the root of *Zärtlichkeit*, means not strong, delicate, young. The same is true of the French word tendre. Alix Strachey7 translates *Zärtlichkeit* with 'affection', 'fondness', 'tenderness'. Of these 'affection' has a double meaning; apart from tenderness it means disease or weakness, as when we speak of an affected heart or affections of the kidney. 'Fond' has even a treble meaning. It is the past participle of the Middle English verb 'fonnen' which means to dote, to befool, of which the present-day words 'fun' and 'funny' are derivatives. The three meanings of 'fond' are (1) vain, inept, thus King Lear is described as 'a very foolish fond old man'; (2) credulous, as 'fond hope'; and (3) affectionate. 'Tender' means: soft, not tough, as in 'tender meat'; easily touched, as in 'tender heart'; susceptible to pain, as in 'tender spot'; delicate, fragile, as in 'tender colour'; immature, young, as in 'tender buds', and only lastly kind and loving.

Something is surely wrong here. How has genital love, the mature form of love got mixed up with this doubtful company of disease, weakness, immaturity, etc.? And still more surprising: the pregenital forms of love—according to the psycho-analytical literature—are not necessarily connected with tenderness, whereas genital love is true only if it has undergone a considerable fusion with tenderness.

Undoubtedly one task of all education and certainly of education in our form of civilization is to teach the individual to love, i.e. to compel him to bring about this kind of fusion. What we call genital love has really very little to do with genitality, in fact it uses the genital sexuality only as a stock on which to graft something that is essentially different. In short, we are expected to give and are expecting to receive, kindness, regard, consideration, etc., even at times when there

is no genital wish, no genital satisfaction to be felt. This is contrary to the habit of most animals which show interest for the other sex only during heat. Man, however, is supposed to show unfailing interest in, and regard for, his partner for ever.

A parallel phenomenon to this everlasting demand for regard is man's prolonged childhood. When animals reach sexual maturity they usually show no further filial or emotional ties to their parents only respect for strength and power. We, however, demand eternal gratitude and in fact man remains a child as long as his parents live, if not to the end of his days. He is expected to, and usually does, pay love, regard, respect, fear, gratitude to his parents for ever. Something similar is demanded in love: a prolonged perpetual emotional tie, not only as long as the genital wish for satisfaction lasts but far beyond it, as long as the partner lives, or even after his death.

According to this idea, what we call 'genital love' is an artefact of civilization like art or religion. It is enforced upon us, irrespective of our biological nature and needs, by the condition that mankind must live in socially organized groups. Genital love is even doubly artificial. Firstly, constant interference with the free sexual gratification (both genital and pregenital) builds up external and later internal resistances against pleasure, and thereby causes passions to develop in order that man should be able to break down these resistances in odd moments. Secondly, the demand for prolonged, perpetual, regard and gratitude forces us to regress to, or even never to egress from, the archaic infantile form of tender love. Man can be regarded therefore as an animal which is retarded even in his 'mature' age in an infantile form of love.

It is interesting that anatomists have discovered similar facts long before we did. The discovery was that anatomically man more resembles the ape embryo than the adult ape. The verdict of the anatomists is that man is biologically retarded, structurally a fœtus, is in fact fœtalized, but in spite of that has attained full genital function.[8], [9] There are several more such instances in the animal kingdom, where an embryo acquires truly developed bisexual genital functions; these are called neotenic embryos. Genital love is an exact parallel to these forms. We find full genital function coupled with infantile behaviour, i.e. man is not only anatomically but also mentally a neotenic embryo.

> *This train of thought can explain a few of the peculiarities of genitality in man. It is well known how unstable genital love is especially as compared with the eternal 'pregenital' forms. Being a phylogenetically*

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[7] Strachey, A.: *A New German-English Psycho-Analytical Vocabulary*. London, Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1943.
[8] Bolk, L.: *Das Problem der Menschwerdung*, 1926.
[9] Keith, Sir A.: 'The Evolution of the Human Races', *J. Roy. Anthr. Soc*. (1928), 58, 312.

> *'new' function it is not yet firmly established; man has not yet had enough time so to speak to adapt himself to this form of love, in fact he has to be trained in every generation anew. Obviously no such training is needed, e.g. for the oral love. Conversely, there is no danger of a breakdown of oral love, whereas genital love is much more delicate.*
>
> *Another peculiarity is the contradictory attitude of society to genital love. On the one hand society admires and worships the unscrupulous he-man or the glamour girl, though with suspicious awe; on the other hand it pays due respect to a lasting genital love, notices and celebrates golden and diamond weddings, but often derides such faithful relations and calls them cautious and sloppy.*

The third phenomenon connected with genital love is a special form of identification which is totally different, from the better studied oral identification and should perhaps be *called genital*

identification. The oral identification is based mainly on introjection: the ego assumes certain qualities of the object but without showing any consideration for it. A good example for this kind of identification is the rite of the holy communion which the believer performs (with the help of a priest) for his own benefit. He wants to be similar to his God and it is no problem for him if God wishes to be incorporated, to be assimilated; all this is taken for granted. The whole situation is different in genital identification, i.e. in a relation based not only on genital satisfaction but also on 'genital love'. Here interests, wishes, feelings, sensitivity, shortcomings of the partner attain—or are supposed to attain—about the same importance, as our own. In a harmonious relation all these conflicting tendencies have to be balanced up very carefully which is anything but an easy task. In order to win a loving and lovable genital object and to keep it for good, nothing can be taken for granted as happens in oral love; one must keep up a permanent, never relaxing, exacting reality testing. This might be called *the work of conquest* (conversely for the subject this means an exacting piece of *adaptation to his object*). It is most exacting in the initial stages of a relation but in a milder form must be maintained unwaveringly throughout the whole duration. In other words, the two partners must always be in harmony.

Again animals are entirely different. If they are on heat both desire the sexual act and hardly any work of conquest is necessary; compared with man there is hardly any preliminary lovemaking. If they are not on heat, the most expert lovemaking is of no avail. Lasting harmony between the partners is not usually demanded. Man, on the other hand, is potentially always on heat, can always be interested; but potentially is always capable of rejecting any would-be partner. The condition of lasting harmony is of paramount importance.

It was Freud[10] who described the importance of forepleasure, i.e. pregenital satisfaction in the work of conquest. This could also be described[11] as a short recapitulation of one's own sexual development before every sexual act. This development, of course, is more or less individual, i.e. different for any two given partners. Harmonious love can only be established where these individual differences are not too great, where mutual identification between the two partners is possible without causing an undue strain.

Thus harmonious genital love requires a constant testing of reality in order that the two partners should be able to find out, and to satisfy, as much as possible of each other's needs and wishes in the forepleasure. Further, we are expected not only to give to our partner as much as we can bear but even to enjoy giving it, while not suffering too much under the necessarily not quite complete satisfaction of our own wishes. All this must go on all the time, both before and after the genital gratification as long as the love relation itself lasts. This work of conquest (and of adaptation) is therefore a mutual attempt by the two partners at satisfying each other's individual wishes and needs which were made individually different, i.e. distorted from the original primitive ones by the process of education. This work causes a considerable strain on the mental apparatus, and only a healthy ego is able to bear it. Still, it cannot be relaxed, till just before the orgasm. Then,

[10] Freud, S.: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sexuality*, New York, 1910.
[11] Balint, M.: 'Eros and Aphrodite', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1938), 19, 199.

however, the happy confidence sets in that everything in the world is now all right, all individual needs are satisfied, all individual differences sunk, only one—identical—wish has remained in which the whole universe submerges, and both subject and partner become one in the 'mystical union'.

But one should never forget that this supreme happiness is to a very large extent an illusion based on a regression to an infantile stage of reality testing. This primitive reality, that the whole world, in particular everything good in the world, is the happy *Me*, testing permits the

individual to believe—for a short time—that all his needs have been satisfied. This is the most primitive stage of object relationship, called by Ferenczi [12] the passive object love. Healthy people are elastic enough to experience this far-going regression without fear, and with complete confidence that they will be able to emerge from it again.

I wish to leave out all the interesting pathological consequences of this theory except one. The most important anxiety connected with this situation is that of losing the mature attitude, and once lost, of not being able to regain it. In these cases, maturity is mainly a defence against the wish of infantilism which means conversely that these people had a very hard task to become mature, achieved it only with considerable difficulty, and therefore they do not dare to let themselves go. For such people every pregenital pleasure is childish, disgusting, even despicable; they cannot give up their 'mature dignity', they do not dare to lose their heads in or before an orgasm.

As is well known, there are three common dangers for a weak ego: (a) psychosis, either transitory as in an acute anxiety state, or chronic as in paranoia or schizophrenic hallucinations; (b) intoxication, either acute as in drunkenness or chronic as in addiction; (c) falling in love. All the poets have known since the beginning of time that these three are closely related and have often spoken of love as mad or intoxicating. The psychological basis of the similarity is the danger of the breakdown of the ego structure. It must be a strong ego that can face this danger with equanimity, proud in the confidence that it will be able to emerge from any danger unscathed and even thrilled and refreshed.

To sum up: 'Genital love' in man is really a misnomer. We can find genital love in the true sense only in animals which develop in a straight, undistorted line from infantile ways of behaviour to mature genital sexuality—and then die. Man, that neotenic embryo, never reaches full maturity, he remains an embryo in his anatomical structure, in his emotional behaviour towards his elders and betters—and in his love life. What we call 'genital love' is a fusion of disagreeing elements: genital satisfaction and pregenital tenderness. The expression of this fusion is 'genital identification', and the reward for bearing the strain of this fusion is the possibility of regressing periodically for some happy moments to a really infantile stage of no reality testing, to the short-lived re-establishment of the complete union of micro- and macrocosmos.

APPENDIX

I. HOMOSEXUAL ORIGINS

If we accept Freud's theory[13] about the beginnings of mankind, a very probable assumption emerges according to which 'genital love'—this queer mixture of genital satisfaction and pregenital tenderness—first developed in a homosexual form. This is another startling paradox, 'genital love' the true form and quintessence of adult sexuality is in its original form homosexual, i.e. perverse, not fully mature. It is obvious, however, that in the 'primal horde', between the primal father and his women, there was no genital love only genital satisfaction. The same was true for the occasional, furtive, sexual acts between the sons and the women. The only relation where 'genital love' could have developed, was the sacred friendly bond uniting the sons in homosexual love against their tyrant-father. As long as this homosexual love remained weak—to break down (after the killing of the father-tyrant) under the impact of the possibility of open heterosexual satisfaction—each of the sons grabbed as many women as his power, cunning, and strength were able to secure for him, and founded a new father horde. When, however, true love developed linking the sons in perpetuity, regard for, and gratitude to, each other prevailed and the 'brother horde' was established. The main features of this new

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12Ferenczi: 'Thalassa. A Theory of Genitality', New York, *Psycho-Anal. Quarterly*, Inc., 1938.
13Freud, S.: *Totem and Tabu*. New York, Moffat Yard, 1918.

organization were (a) respect for, and regard to, the fair rights, wishes, interests of every male member; (b) a periodical, complicated, sacred ceremony with strong, hardly aim-inhibited, genital-homosexual features re-uniting again and again all adult males; and (c) rather simple, straightforward heterosexual genitality, without much sentimental, romantic fuss.

Pending the final verdict of the anthropologists whether this idea is compatible with the available facts or otherwise, it will be permissible to use it as a working hypothesis and to follow up the spreading of the 'genital love' from its original homosexual sphere into the heterosexual genitality and into the social life.

II. HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONS

In every form of civilization the trend is unmistakably towards curbing and limiting the coarse, straightforward genital gratification and developing more and more complicated 'refined' forms of love. Conversely this means an ever-increasing intrusion of pregenital and therefore infantile, 'perverse' stimulations and gratifications into adult genitality changing it into 'love making' in the sense of the various *artes amandi*.

As pointed out previously, the attitude towards any human love object is, as a rule, ambivalent: willing and reluctant at the same time. To change it into a 'genital partner' is a strenuous task, which I called the 'work of conquest'. This begins with the acceptance of the fact that our object is a singular individual, because he too was subjected to a tortuous form of education, forcing upon him various likes and dislikes, different from ours. And further that our object will agree to the role of a genital partner only if in a fair compromise due regard will be given to a large part of his (her) individual peculiarities.

Thus, lasting genital relations are always based on a mixture of harmony and strain, an uncertain enough foundation, especially if we realize that individual developments continue throughout life. The, often hypocritical, demand for absolute monogamy is based on the assumption that once harmonious genital relations have been established between two partners, their individual developments will run parallel for ever. Unfortunately, as common experience shows, this assumption is correct in exceptional cases only.

A fairly frequent solution of the strain caused by the diverging individual developments is the gradual change of the originally passionate, genital, love-relation, into a less passionate, tender, more or less aim-inhibited, true and warm, heterosexual friendship. Many a naughty comedy, and many a serious psychological novel, describes this kind of solution, showing this or that facet of its many complicated possibilities. What interests us, however, is the ontogenetic emergence of the phylogenetically original form of friendly love out of the burnt-out passions of genital sexuality.

III. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Genital sexuality is highly exclusive, indeed it can be called egotistic and asocial. Nothing and nobody exists apart from the two partners, any outside event or stimulus is disturbing, even painful.

Pregenital sexuality has a much wider field ranging from lonely narcissism to wholesale group gratifications; vide the pleasures of the white table, smoking, football and boxing matches, royal pageants, theatres, etc. All these can be enjoyed by a single person as well as by a large group, organized or unorganized. The only condition of such a group enjoyment is that due regard must be paid by everyone to the interests and peculiarities of the average member, that each of the members should be content with a more or less 'average' share. This 'average' share may be

more or may be less than would correspond to the wishes and individuality of any given member, but still he is expected to enjoy his share.

This was certainly not true in the father horde. The first relation where the 'average' share idea developed was the homosexual love cementing the brother horde together. Since then every social development can be regarded as a voluntary or enforced acceptance of the demand for an increased regard for the interests and wishes of the 'average' member. My present thesis is that usually the new demand is recognized first in the (homosexual) relation between men and men and only secondarily is extended to women, thus repeating the early stages of man's social evolution.

One interesting phase of this process is the modern demand for equality in every respect for both sexes (franchise, legal rights, access to higher education and to the professions, equal pay and so forth). Such a demand certainly is against the testimony of biology, which irrefutably proves that the two sexes are not equal. This, however, does not mean—as is

generally assumed by the stronger sex and enforced throughout the social life—that man is superior in every way to woman. Psychologically, however, the demand for universal equality is the result of a consequent development. 'All males must be equal' was the homosexual phase of the brother horde described above, 'women must have equal deal to men' is the spreading of the homosexual love into the heterosexual sphere.

If this is true, civilization means a gradual conquering of all relations between man and man by sublimated, aim-inhibited, homosexual love and only secondarily the transference of those new loving forms to the relation between man and woman. One has the impression—though it may be only an unjustified male slander against the gentle sex—that the relation between woman and woman is the sphere least civilized by this process of evolution.

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2 Fenichel, O.: *The Psycho-Analytic Theory of Neurosis*, New York, Norton, 1945.